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LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP AND
SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE, 1950–2010
by
Camden Hutchison*
Although law and economics has influenced nearly every area of American law, few have been as deeply and as thoroughly “economized” as antitrust. Beginning in the 1970s, antitrust law—traditionally informed
by populist hostility to economic concentration—was dramatically transformed by a new and overriding focus on economic efficiency. This transformation was associated with a provocative new wave of antitrust
scholarship, which claimed that economic efficiency (or “consumer welfare”) was the sole legitimate aim of antitrust policy. The U.S. Supreme
Court seemingly agreed, issuing decision after decision rejecting traditional antitrust values and adopting the efficiency norm of the law and
economics movement. By century’s end, the populist origins of antitrust
had faded into memory, and the professional discourse of the antitrust
community (scholars, practitioners, and judges) had become dominated
by economic analysis.
Although this transformation in antitrust law has been the subject of
considerable academic commentary, its causes remain poorly understood.
Many scholars assume, sometimes tacitly, that the economic analysis of
law and economics scholarship had a direct, educative influence on the
Supreme Court. Other scholars argue that changes in the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence were merely a reflection of changes in its composition,
specifically the conservative appointments of the Nixon administration.
What these opposing interpretations share in common is their limited evidentiary basis—both are derived from impressionistic reviews of a select
number of Supreme Court decisions, rather than systematic analysis of
larger historical trends.
This Article moves beyond previous scholarship by presenting a comprehensive, quantitative study of every Supreme Court antitrust case from
1950 to 2010, a period including the decades before, during, and after
the economic turn in antitrust. This comprehensive approach allows for
*
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more generalized conclusions regarding the real-world influence of law
and economics scholarship. Based on both quantitative and qualitative
evidence, this Article concludes that the Nixon appointments of the late
1960s and early 1970s were the primary cause of changes in antitrust
jurisprudence, but that academic developments have infused these
changes with an intellectual legitimacy they might otherwise have lacked,
broadening their appeal and effectively insulating them from future
changes in the composition of the Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Law and economics—the application of economic theory to legal
analysis—is widely considered among the most influential developments
in legal scholarship of the past half-century. And while the law and economics movement has influenced nearly every area of American law
(from corporate governance to family relations, and from contracts to
the Constitution), few have been as deeply and as thoroughly “economized” as antitrust. Beginning in the 1970s, antitrust law—traditionally
informed by populist hostility to economic concentration—was dramatically transformed by a new and overriding focus on economic efficiency.
This transformation was inspired by a provocative new wave of antitrust
scholarship, which argued that economic efficiency (or “consumer wel1
fare”) was the sole legitimate aim of antitrust policy. Much of this scholarship criticized traditional, populist antitrust jurisprudence as ideologically biased, doctrinally incoherent, and (worst of all) harmful to the
2
American economy. Armed with the analytical tools of neoclassical price
theory, many scholars instead advocated a market-based approach to antitrust law, skeptical of the benefits of active government intervention.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court—arguably the most
powerful institution in shaping U.S. antitrust policy—seemed to embrace
this view, handing down decision after decision rejecting traditional antitrust values and adopting the efficiency norm of the law and economics
movement. By century’s end, the populist origins of antitrust had faded
into memory, and the professional discourse of the antitrust community
(scholars, practitioners, and judges) had become dominated by economic analysis. Not coincidentally—and for better or for worse—the scope
and vigor of antitrust enforcement had also significantly diminished.
Although this transformation in antitrust law has been the subject of
extensive academic commentary, its causes remain poorly understood.
There is broad consensus in the antitrust literature that economics has
1

This scholarship has traditionally been associated with the University of
Chicago. The “Chicago School” of antitrust has included both economists (such as
Aaron Director, Ward Bowman, and George Stigler) as well as economically-minded
legal scholars (such as Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook).
Although the terms “Chicago School” and “law and economics” are often used
interchangeably, this Article argues for a broader conception of law and economics,
including scholars who might consider themselves in opposition to the Chicago
perspective. It remains true, however, that Chicagoans have been among the most
influential proponents of the economic approach to antitrust. The classic (and most
doctrinaire) expression of the Chicago perspective is Robert H. Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (The Free Press ed., 1993)
(1978).
2
The traditional antitrust paradigm, suspicious of a wide range of business
practices, has been referred to as antitrust’s “inhospitality tradition.” See Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1984).
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profoundly influenced the field, but little explanation as to exactly how
this influence was achieved. Many scholars assume, sometimes tacitly, that
the economic analysis of law and economics scholarship had a direct, ed3
ucative influence on the Supreme Court. Under this view, Supreme
Court Justices were enlightened by modern economic theory, leading
them to reject the populist interventionism that had characterized earlier
antitrust jurisprudence. Other scholars have challenged this narrative,
arguing that changes in the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence primarily reflected changes in its composition, specifically the conservative appointments of the Nixon presidency (Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and
4
Rehnquist), which shifted the ideological balance of the Court. Under
this interpretation, conservative Justices were ideologically predisposed
toward business-friendly antitrust decisions, for which the market-based
reasoning of law and economics was simply a convenient justification.
Robert Bork himself, among the Chicago School’s most influential figures, attributed the change to both factors (though he characterized the
5
Nixon appointments as the “decisive cause”). Ultimately, what these different interpretations share in common is their limited evidentiary basis—most are derived from impressionistic reviews of a select number of
Supreme Court decisions, rather than systematic analysis of larger historical trends. Given the focus of existing scholarship on the doctrinal fea-

3

See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts, 79
Antitrust L.J. 941, 944 (2014) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Legislative Intent]; Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency and
Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 217, 218 (2010)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis]; William E. Kovacic, Failed
Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for
Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1105, 1134 (1989) [hereinafter Kovacic, Failed
Expectations]; William E. Kovacic, Out of Control? Robert Bork’s Portrayal of the U.S.
Antitrust System in the 1970s, 79 Antitrust L.J. 855, 878 (2014) [hereinafter Kovacic,
Out of Control?]; William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and
the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 Wayne L. Rev. 1413, 1417 (1990);
George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of the Antitrust Paradox, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 455, 456 (2008); Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy: Where It
Has Been, Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be in Its Third Century, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 239, 248 (1999); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger
Court’s Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 2 (1982); see
also Marc Allen Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics:
Institutions, Expertise, and Policy Change 185–87 (1991) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s adoption of the efficiency norm in antitrust cases).
4
See, e.g., Andrew Gavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of
Change in the Supreme Court, Antitrust, Fall 2002, at 8; Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law
and Economics, and the Courts, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1987, at 181, 215;
Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 Antitrust L.J. 649, 651–52
(2014).
5
Bork, supra note 1, at x–xiv.

LCB_21_1_Article_4_Hutchison (Do Not Delete)

2017]

LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP

2/26/2017 12:20 PM

149

tures of individual cases, the broader influence of economic theory on
the Supreme Court remains uncertain.
This Article moves beyond previous scholarship by presenting a
comprehensive, quantitative study of every Supreme Court antitrust case
from 1950 to 2010, a period including the decades before, during, and
after the economic turn in antitrust. To conduct this study, I compiled a
database of all of the Court’s antitrust cases within the relevant period of
interest, coding each decision and each individual Justice’s vote for a
number of variables relating to law and economics scholarship. Rather
than focusing on the judicial language of only the most pivotal antitrust
opinions, the method employed by most previous scholars, I have attempted to identify systematic relationships between specific variables
(number of citations to law and economics scholarship, for example) and
the Court’s broader voting patterns. This approach allows for more generalized conclusions regarding the practical influence of law and eco6
nomics.
My methodology is inspired by the political science literature on the
Supreme Court, much of which emphasizes quantitative analysis over the
doctrinal focus of legal scholarship. My project is most directly influenced by the work of Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal; like many studies
of the Supreme Court, my database of antitrust cases is derived from
7
Spaeth’s much larger U.S. Supreme Court Database. Spaeth and Segal’s
influence extends beyond choice of methodology, moreover, as their

6

Although most studies of changes in antitrust law have relied on traditional
qualitative methods, a small number of legal scholars have approached the subject
from a quantitative perspective. William Kovacic’s statistical analysis of antitrust
decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals is a particularly impressive example. William
E. Kovacic, Reagan’s Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev.
49, 55 (1991); see also William E. Kovacic, Judicial Appointments and the Future of
Antitrust Policy, Antitrust, Spring 1993, at 8, 9 [hereinafter Kovacic, Judicial
Appointments]. Also, Hillary Greene and Daniel Sokol have conducted a citation
analysis of the influence of the Areeda-Hovenkamp antitrust treatise. Hillary Greene
& D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2039,
2040–41 (2015). The economist Vivek Ghosal has modeled the influence of the
Chicago School on Department of Justice antitrust enforcement activity. Vivek
Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J. Compet. L. &
Econ. 733, 733–44 (2011). Finally, Douglas Ginsburg and Leah Brannon have
presented quantitative data on Supreme Court antitrust cases from 1967 to 2007.
Leah Brannon & Douglas Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to
2007, Compet. Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2007, at 3, 13–20.
7
The Supreme Court Database, Wash. U. Law, http://supremecourtdatabase.org
(last updated July 12, 2016). This database—the most widely used in social science
studies of the Supreme Court—is the foundation of Spaeth and Segal’s empirical
research on Supreme Court voting behavior. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth,
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model xvi–xvii (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal
& Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited i
(2002) [hereinafter Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited].
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theory of judicial behavior suggests a useful framework for studying antitrust. In their work, Spaeth and Segal contrast the traditional “legal”
model of Supreme Court voting, in which decisions are made by objective application of legal principles to the facts of the case, with their own
“attitudinal” model, in which Justices vote according to their ideological
8
views in order to achieve subjective policy preferences. Based on their
research findings, Spaeth and Segal reject the legal model, claiming the
attitudinal model better predicts observed Supreme Court voting pat9
terns.
In the antitrust literature, the legal and attitudinal models are paralleled by the contrasting perspectives on law and economics—one emphasizing its objective persuasiveness, the other claiming ideological bias.
Although the efficiency arguments of law and economics may not be “le10
gal” in the strictest sense, they can nevertheless be analogized to traditional legal arguments. Under this analogy, the “legal” model would predict that antitrust cases are decided according to the persuasiveness of
the parties’ economic claims. This perspective assumes that questions of
economics are susceptible to objective judicial determination. The attitudinal model, on the other hand, would place little significance on the
parties’ arguments, predicting instead that Justices vote per their preexisting ideological preferences. This perspective assumes that Supreme
Court appointees are fundamentally partial in matters of economic policy. The differences between legal and economic reasoning mean that this
is not a perfect analogy; given the prominence of economic policy considerations in many Supreme Court cases, one might even conceive of an
11
“expertise” model in place of the more general legal model. Whether
conceived as a matter of legal reasoning or as a matter of economic expertise, however, this central distinction between knowledge and ideology is the historical problem at the heart of my study. Did law and economics provide the Court with a more sophisticated analytical
framework? Or—as suggested by the attitudinal model—did it merely
provide rhetorical cover for Justices’ preexisting ideological views?

8

Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, supra note 7, at 48–97. The
“legal” model is, of course, the model most familiar to trained lawyers.
9
See id. at 428–35. Spaeth and Segal also discuss a third, “rational choice” model,
in which Justices engage in strategic behavior in order to achieve subjective policy
preferences. See id. at 97. Since the rational choice model is essentially a more
complex variation of the attitudinal model, this Article will limit its discussion to the
legal and attitudinal models.
10
Law and economics often emphasizes economic efficiency over traditional
legal authority. As discussed infra Part III, efficiency arguments have proven highly
successful in antitrust cases.
11
The rise of economics as a form of (ostensibly) objective policy expertise is
addressed in Eisner, supra note 3, at 188.
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Based on my research, this Article argues that the Nixon appointments of the late 1960s and early 1970s were the primary cause of the major changes in antitrust jurisprudence, but that academic developments
have infused these changes with an intellectual legitimacy they might
otherwise have lacked, effectively insulating them from future changes to
the partisan balance of the Court. Although the conservative decisions of
the Burger Court were—I argue—driven by ideology rather than scholarship, the academic theories used to justify these decisions have been influential across the political spectrum. The result has been a rightward
shift throughout the entire antitrust community, not only in specific policy views, but in fundamental value assumptions as well. Although this
complex relationship among politics, law, and scholarship has been particularly influential in the antitrust field, similar patterns can also be ob12
served in other economically-oriented fields of law. The conjunction of
knowledge and ideology that has characterized the history of antitrust law
therefore speaks to broader developments in recent American legal history.
The conclusions of this Article are subject to certain qualifications.
First, and most obviously, the antitrust decisions of the Supreme Court
are only one of several sources of antitrust law—even within the judicial
branch, they represent but a small fraction of the antitrust cases decided
by the federal courts. The vast majority of antitrust cases are resolved by
district courts and the U.S. courts of appeals, which arguably play a more
13
important role in determining actual antitrust disputes. In addition, antitrust trials in the district courts often feature greater economic content
than Supreme Court review, as they regularly include the participation of
economists as expert trial witnesses. That said, in light of the final authority of the Supreme Court and its power to shape nationwide antitrust policy—as well as the ready availability of Supreme Court briefs, oral arguments, and other supporting case materials for research—an exclusive
focus on Supreme Court cases can be justified on practical grounds. Second, the aggregate data presented in this Article does not, in and of itself, convey certain of the most important changes in the Supreme
Court’s antitrust caseload, including the end of automatic appeals under
14
the Expediting Act, the reduction in government enforcement actions

12

Bankruptcy, corporate law, and securities regulation, for example.
See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise in
the Lower Courts and What It Means for Institutional Reform in Antitrust, 100 Iowa L. Rev.
1919, 1920 (2015). Not all antitrust cases are federal, moreover. Indeed, with the
retrenchment of federal antitrust enforcement over the past 35 years, state attorneys
general have assumed a larger role in antitrust prosecution.
14
The Expediting Act, enacted in 1903, allowed direct appeal to the Supreme
Court in civil antitrust cases in which the government was the plaintiff. Expediting
Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 29
(2012)). This procedure was repealed in 1974 by the Antitrust Procedures and
13
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15

during the Reagan administration, and changing patterns in the Court’s
16
certiorari process, all of which have contributed to a significant decrease in the number of Supreme Court antitrust cases heard each year.
Indeed, this decrease is so significant that comparisons between earlier
and later years in the database become difficult. Finally—as discussed in
greater detail in Part II—individual coding decisions often entailed subjective judgments, particularly in ambiguous or marginal cases. Although
I have tried to be as transparent and consistent as possible in my coding
methodology, the very nature of the data means that other researchers
using the same evidence would likely code at least some cases different17
ly.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II presents
quantitative findings, together with a discussion of methodology. The
general conclusion of these findings is that Supreme Court antitrust decisions are largely (though not exclusively) determined by Justices’ preexisting policy views. Part III presents three qualitative case studies which
illustrate the general patterns discussed in Part II. For this Section of the
Article, I have selected three well-known cases dating from before, during, and after the economic turn in antitrust jurisprudence: Brown Shoe
Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). Together, these cases demonstrate how the
very conception of antitrust has changed over the decades—not only
among Justices, but among scholars and practitioners as well. Part IV
concludes, discussing the relevance of these findings to the future direction of Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence, as well as their significance to broader changes in U.S. legal-economic policy.
II. QUANTITATIVE DATA
The influence of law and economics (particularly the Chicago
School) on U.S. competition policy has been a major concern of antitrust
scholarship since at least the 1980s. Scores of articles, lectures, and even

Penalties Act, Pub. L. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
15
For a detailed study of the reduction in government enforcement actions
under the Reagan administration, including the promulgation of revised merger
guidelines by the Department of Justice, see Eisner, supra note 3, at 184–227.
16
The Court’s plenary docket has significantly decreased in recent decades, for a
variety of reasons. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 737 (2001); Ryan J. Owens &
David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1219 (2012); Kenneth W. Starr, Essay, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The
Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363 (2006).
17
All data used in this Article are available from the author upon request.

LCB_21_1_Article_4_Hutchison (Do Not Delete)

2017]

2/26/2017 12:20 PM

LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP

153

18

entire books have addressed the subject. Much of this scholarship has
emphasized doctrinal, “internalistic” analysis of only the most well-known
antitrust cases, while some has limited its focus to only a specific area of
19
antitrust law (e.g., price discrimination, vertical restraints, etc.). This Article presents a much broader perspective, assessing every Supreme Court
antirust case from 1950 to 2010.
A. Case Selection and Coding
The population of cases included in this study consists of every Supreme Court case (1) directly involving antitrust issues, (2) decided on
the merits (i.e., excluding certiorari determinations), and (3) decided
20
between (and including) the 1950 and 2010 Court terms. Although my
primary period of interest was originally the 1970s and 1980s, the decades in which I assumed the influence of law and economics was most
decisive, I included “extra” decades both before and after this period to
provide historical baselines for comparison. As it turns out, the data from
after the 1980s are in certain ways the most interesting.
The first step in constructing my database was to search for all Supreme Court cases between 1950 and 2010 that are assigned the topic
“29T” (antitrust and trade regulation) in the Westlaw legal database system. This search yielded 292 cases. Of these, I excluded “pure” trade
regulation cases that lacked meaningful antitrust issues. Examples of
such excluded cases include FTC actions concerning commercial fraud,
false advertising, and other deceptive or unfair trade practices. Excluding
these cases left a remaining total of 244 antitrust cases, dating from the

18

For but a small sample, see How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark:
The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert
Pitofsky ed., 2008); Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law 1 (Antonio
Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002); Ingo L. O. Schmidt & Jan B. Rittaler, A Critical
Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis at ix–x (1989);
Brannon & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 21; Ginsburg, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at
941; Frank Easterbrook, The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 439 (2008); Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at
217; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 181; Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 3, at 1134;
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 17–32
(2007); Kovacic, Judicial Appointments, supra note 6, at 50; Kovacic, Out of Control?,
supra note 3, at 878; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979); Priest, supra note 3, at 456; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 23.
19
“Internalism,” a term borrowed from the history of science, refers here to the
study of ideas purely in terms of their narrow intellectual context.
20
The Supreme Court operates on an “October term” system, whereby cases are
heard and decided beginning the first Monday in October and continuing to the
following spring/summer. For purposes of this study, cases are assigned to the year in
which the relevant Supreme Court term began, rather than the calendar year in
which the case was decided (if different).
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1950 to 2009 October terms (no antitrust cases were decided in the 2010
21
October term).
After identifying the population of cases, I pulled them from the
U.S. Supreme Court Database and inserted them into my own custom data file. For purposes of this study, the most important information in the
U.S. Supreme Court Database was the Justice-level vote data associated
with each case. These data permitted analysis of individual Justices’ voting patterns in relation to case-level variables. Unfortunately, few of the
case-level variables included in the U.S. Supreme Court Database were
relevant to my particular research questions. I therefore coded my own
set of variables based on my own analysis of the cases in the database.
This required reading each and every decision, as well as the corresponding briefs of the parties and amici curiae, and assigning each case numerical values for several variables relating to law and economics scholarship.
Description and analysis of these variables is provided below.
B. Case-Level Patterns
This Part II.B discusses case-level patterns—i.e., patterns in the outcomes of Supreme Court cases, rather than the votes of individual Justices. These case-level patterns are not particularly surprising, as they tend
to confirm many widely-held assumptions. Specifically, the data show that
during the period under examination, (1) the Court became more likely
to issue “market-based” antitrust decisions, (2) the Court, litigants, and
amici curiae increasingly cited law and economics scholarship, and (3)
antitrust cases became increasingly characterized by the presence of formal economic arguments.
1. Decision Outcomes
Perhaps the most basic measure of ideational change in Supreme
Court antitrust jurisprudence is the extent to which the Court’s decisions
have reflected the market logic of law and economics. To assess this
change in quantitative terms, I coded each decision in the database as either “market-based” or “interventionist.” Decisions coded as “marketbased” reflect a narrow economic view of antitrust, often deferring to
market outcomes and emphasizing economic efficiency. Policies associated with market-based decisions include (for example) relative toler22
ance toward economic concentration, the rejection of per se rules
21

At the time of writing, the latest case in the dataset was Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010), which was decided May 24, 2010 as part of the
Court’s 2009 term.
22
A “per se” rule is a Court-created decision rule that certain market practices
are illegal per se under the antitrust laws. If a plaintiff can establish that a defendant’s
actions fall within the scope of a per se rule, judicial inquiry ends and the behavior is
deemed conclusively illegal, regardless of any economic benefits claimed by the
defendant. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
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against practices other than horizontal restraints, and an assumption that
23
unilateral market practices are usually efficient. Decisions coded as “interventionist,” on the other hand, reflect more traditional antitrust values, emphasizing social and political concerns rather than economic efficiency. Interventionist themes include (again, for example) hostility
toward even moderate levels of economic concentration, fundamental
suspicion of aggressive market behavior, and the application of per se
rules to a wide variety of market practices. Given the broad scope of these
two categories, certain cases in the database could potentially be coded as
both. For example, as I have defined them, the “market-based” and “interventionist” positions on horizontal price fixing are essentially the
same—both would advocate per se prohibition. The two categories are
not always mutually exclusive, in other words. Since the focus of my analysis is the Court’s consistency with market-based antitrust scholarship, deci24
sions consistent with both categories were coded as market-based. Certain decisions were difficult to categorize as either market-based or interinterventionist (cases involving various forms of antitrust immunity, for
example). Rather than exclude these cases from the analysis, I simply did
25
the best I could based on a close reading of the particular decision.
The propensity of the Court to issue market-based decisions in a given term was calculated by dividing the number of market-based decisions
by the total number of antitrust decisions that term (thereby normalizing
for the varying number of antitrust decisions per term). The resulting
percentage data for the 1950–2009 terms are shown in Figure 1 below:

Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775, 776–77 (1965). Per se rules can be contrasted with
the more permissive antitrust “rule of reason.” Id. The last several decades of antitrust
jurisprudence have witnessed a substantial narrowing of per se rules.
23
Use of the term “market-based” is potentially ambiguous, as even the Chicago
School advocates prohibiting certain market practices, most notably cartel
arrangements. Moreover, “interventionist” policy was often inspired by classical
economic models of perfect market competition. Despite this overlap between the
two terms, I believe a “market-based”/“interventionist” binary is less ambiguous than
the traditionally-used “conservative”/“liberal” binary.
24
This coding rule may result in a bias toward categorizing decisions as marketbased. However, it allows an unbiased measure of change in the Court’s decision
making over time. See infra Figure 1.
25
In the U.S. Supreme Court Database, decisions are coded under the
conventional rubric of “conservative” versus “liberal.” In 73% of the cases in my
database, this conservative/liberal categorization corresponds with my own marketbased/interventionist categorization (i.e., a case coded as “conservative” in the U.S.
Supreme Court Database is coded as “market-based” in my own database, or vice
versa). The primary source of discrepancies between the two coding schemes is that
decisions imposing antitrust liability for horizontal price fixing, market allocation,
and other cartel-like arrangements are coded as “liberal” in the U.S. Supreme Court
Database and “market-based” in my own database (under the logic that even the
Chicago School advocates prohibiting inefficient horizontal restraints).
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Figure 1. Percentage of Market-Based Antitrust Decisions,
by Term
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Trendline

After the 1992 term, the data become intermittent, as 1992 was the last
26
term the Court consistently decided at least one antitrust case per term.
Although the Court decided fewer antitrust cases after 1992, its likelihood of issuing a market-based decision in any given case continued to
increase. Significantly, in six of the eight terms after 1992 in which the
Court decided at least one antitrust case, 100% of its decisions were coded as market-based.
As these data illustrate, the general perception that Supreme Court
antitrust decisions have become increasingly market-oriented is correct.
Although aggregate decision data does not explain what caused this increase, the timing of the shift toward market-based antitrust decisions—
most pronounced in the early 1970s—suggests that judicial appointments
likely played an important role. President Nixon made his first Court appointment in 1969 (Chief Justice Burger), and the 1972 term was the first
full term in which all four of Nixon’s appointees (Burger, plus Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist) served together on the Court. So composed, the
Burger Court was much more likely to issue market-based antitrust decisions than the preceding Warren Court (which was less likely to issue
market-based decisions than the preceding Vinson Court), as shown in
Figure 1. The role of specific Justices in the Court’s antitrust decisions is
discussed in greater detail in Part II.C below.
2. Law and Economics Citations
In addition to the outcomes of the cases themselves, another relevant measure of the influence of law and economics is the number of ci26

In Figures 1–7, terms in which no antitrust cases were decided are excluded
from the bar charts. The time axes are therefore more compressed for the years
1993–2009 than for 1950–1992.
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tations by the Court, parties (both plaintiffs and defendants), and amici
curiae in their respective case documents. Citations by the Court itself
are the clearest indication of influence, but citations in party and amicus
briefs are also relevant, for two reasons: First, economic arguments derived from parties’ or amici’s academic citations may influence the
Court’s decisions, even in cases where the Court does not cite the academic literature itself. Second, the amount of law and economics citations in party and amici briefs may suggest the general “state of the law,”
in that it indicates what type of arguments litigants expect the Court to
27
respond to.
For purposes of this study, a “law and economics citation” means any
citation to any book or article: (1) addressing the subject of competition
law and (2) written by (a) an economist or (b) a legal scholar significantly relying on economic theory. In deciding whether to count a citation as
a “law and economics citation,” I did not draw a distinction between “conservative” (or market-based) and “liberal” (or interventionist) scholarship. Any citation to any book or article relying substantially on economic
theory was counted, regardless of the political orientation or policy con28
clusions of the cited author. My decision to treat all economic scholarship equally represents an attempt to determine whether economic analysis, in and of itself, is associated with particular policy conclusions,

27

A difficulty with citation analysis is controlling for changes in the total number
of all citations over time. If judges and practitioners are simply citing more of
everything, an increase in a specific type of citation may not be particularly
meaningful. With respect to Supreme Court opinions, recent empirical research
indicates that citations to certain types of authority (prior Supreme Court decisions
and non-legal secondary sources) have increased since World War II, for a variety of
reasons. Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 531–40 (2010); James H. Fowler et
al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S.
Supreme Court, 15 Pol. Analysis 324, 333 (2007); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J.
Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 495, 500–03
(2000). On the other hand, in their study of citations to non-legal sources, Schauer
and Wise also present evidence that neither the annual page output nor the average
number of citations per page of reported Court opinions has significantly changed
over the same time period. See id. at 500.
Unfortunately, due to practical constraints and a lack of relevant data, I was
unable to control for possible changes in total citations. However, as the increase in
law and economics citations shown in Figure 2 exceeds the increase in citations to
prior Court decisions over the same period, Fowler et al., supra, at 333, I suspect that
the increase in law and economics citations is a largely independent phenomenon.
To my knowledge, no research suggests any systematic increase in total citations in
party and amici briefs.
28
A citation to Joe Bain was counted the same as a citation to George Stigler, for
example. As a practical matter, the majority of legal-economic citations by the Court,
parties, and amici were free-market in orientation, particularly in the later years of
the database.
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distinct from the exogenous political leanings of particular law and economics scholars.
According to the conventional wisdom, the Chicago School was re29
sponsible for introducing economic analysis to antitrust law. If correct,
this view implies a correlation in time between the rise of the Chicago
School in the 1970s and the prevalence of law and economics citations in
case documents. Many commentators have challenged this conventional
wisdom, however. According to these scholars, economics has always
played an important role in antitrust law, and the novelty of the Chicago
30
School was in the specific type of economics it embodied. If the economic approach to antitrust law predates the rise of the Chicago School, as
these arguments suggest, one would expect to see the absence of a correlation between the rise of the Chicago School and law and economics citations. Given these differing perspectives, the empirical question of how
often and when the Court, litigants, and amici curiae have cited law and
economics scholarship becomes particularly significant.
Beginning with the Court itself, Figure 2 shows the average number
31
32
of law and economics citations per majority opinion for each term:
Figure 2. Average Law and Economics Citations
per Majority Opinion, by Term
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29

Trendline

For an example of this conventional wisdom, see Priest, supra note 3, at 456.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm,
in How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative
Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust 109, 109 (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 217–20 (1985) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Antitrust After Chicago]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and
Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 Antitrust Bull. 613, 616–17
(2010); Kaplow, supra note 4, at 184–87; Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust
and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J. 1511,
1520–22 (1984). Even members of the Chicago School itself acknowledge the
importance of the earlier “Harvard School” of antitrust economics. See, e.g., Posner,
supra note 18, at 929.
31
This analysis does not include concurrences or dissents, mainly due to
personal time constraints.
30
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Figure 2 displays a similar pattern as Figure 1: in general, the Court cited
law and economics scholarship infrequently prior to the 1970s, while law
and economics citations were most common in the last two decades of
the time series. Thus, the increase in market-based Court decisions seen
in Figure 1 seems to have been accompanied by a similar increase in law
and economics citations. Given the relative lack of citations in the first
two decades of the time series, these data cast doubt on the argument
33
that economics has always been central to antitrust law. Although the
structuralist scholarship of these earlier decades may have been influential in academic circles, it was rarely cited by the Court.
Continuing on to plaintiffs and defendants, Figure 3 shows the average combined total law and economics citations contained in (1) the initial brief, (2) the reply brief (if applicable), and (3) the supplemental
brief (if applicable) of each party per case, for each term in the data34
base:
Figure 3. Average Law and Economics Citations
per Party, by Term
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1998 2009
Plaintiffs

Defendants

Trendline (Plaintiffs)

Trendline (Defendants)

Again, law and economics citations increased in the 1970s and 1980s.
When the data are plotted as a graph, however, this trend is overshad32

The average (arithmetic mean) of law and economics citations per majority
opinion was calculated by summing the law and economics citations in all majority
opinions in a given term, then dividing by the number of decisions that term. When
summing citations, multiple citations to the same work within a single opinion were
each counted as separate citations.
33
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
34
The average (arithmetic mean) of law and economics citations per set of
initial, reply, and supplemental briefs was calculated by summing the law and
economics citations included in all sets of briefs in a given term, then dividing by the
number of cases that term (this procedure was performed separately for plaintiffs and
defendants). When summing citations, multiple citations to the same work within a
single set of briefs were each counted as separate citations.
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owed by the very high number of defendant citations in 2005, 2006, and
2008. Although these extreme averages are partly the result of fewer antitrust cases per term (only a single antitrust case was decided in the 2008
term, for example), they also reflect a significant increase in law and
economics citations by defendants’ counsel. This increase may be a strategic response to the Court’s extremely high rate of market-based antitrust decisions since the early 1990s.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the average law and economics citations per
amicus brief, broken down by pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff amici, for
35
each term:
Figure 4. Average Law and Economics Citations
per Amicus Curiae Brief, by Term
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Trendline (Pro-plaintiff)
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Figure 4 displays the familiar pattern of increasing law and economics citations. Averaging the number of citations per brief obscures two additional trends in amicus practice, however. First, the average number of
filings per case increased significantly over the time series, from no filings
at all during the first several years to a high of 19 in Verizon Communica36
tions Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP in 2003. The phenomenon of increasing amicus filings is hardly unique to antitrust law—

35

In keeping with the decision to only include cases decided on the merits (and
therefore to exclude certiorari determinations), I only examined amicus briefs
addressing the merits of the case. Filings by amici recommending or opposing
certiorari are not included in Figure 4.
The average (arithmetic mean) of law and economics citations per amicus brief
was calculated by summing the law and economics citations in all amicus briefs in a
given term, then dividing by the total number of amicus briefs filed that term (this
procedure was performed separately for pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff amici).
When summing citations, multiple citations to the same work within a single brief
were each counted as separate citations.
36
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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indeed, it pervades nearly every area of the Supreme Court’s docket.
Given the tendency of amici to emphasize economic policy arguments in
antitrust cases, however, this phenomenon has been a major source of
38
increasing law and economics citations. Second, aggregate data fails to
highlight individual amicus briefs containing very high numbers of law
and economics citations. These briefs become particularly notable in the
final decade of the time series, in which many cases feature economicsheavy amicus briefs filed by business groups, policy institutes, and even
rival schools of antitrust scholars. For example, several recent cases feature amicus briefs by scholars advocating stereotypical Chicago School
positions, as well as briefs from scholars advocating opposing “post39
Chicago” positions. This direct participation in Supreme Court cases by
legal-economic scholars is an important example of the increasing economization of the both practice and discourse of antitrust law.
Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 indicate that law and economics citations by the Court, parties, and amici curiae were relatively infrequent
prior to the 1970s. Citations began to increase thereafter, accelerating in
the 1990s. While the infrequency of law and economics citations during
the 1950s and 1960s supports the view that economic theory was not yet
central to antitrust law, the reasons for the subsequent increase in citations remain open to debate. Since this increase is roughly correlated
with the academic rise of the Chicago School, increasing citations may
have been a function of the Chicago School’s intellectual influence. On
the other hand, the increase begins in earnest only after the arrival of the
Nixon appointees, suggesting that increasing citations may also have
been a function of a more sympathetic, market-oriented Court. The con37

For discussion of the general phenomenon of increasing amicus filings, see
Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 807, 811 (2004);
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 744 (2000); see also Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends?
Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & Pol. 33, 34 (2004).
38
See supra Figure 4.
39
The term “post-Chicago” refers to antitrust scholarship that shares the Chicago
School’s normative emphasis on economic efficiency, but criticizes its economic
models as overly simplistic. Post-Chicago scholarship has attempted to add concepts
derived from game theory, behavioral analysis, and other forms of dynamic economic
modeling to antitrust law. Although post-Chicago scholarship has been influential in
the academic world, it has had less impact on Supreme Court jurisprudence, where
the Chicago School remains dominant. For a variety of perspectives on post-Chicago
antitrust scholarship, see, for example, How the Chicago School Overshot the
Mark, supra note 18; Daniel A. Crane, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on Antitrust Institutions,
78 Antitrust L.J. 43 (2012); Hovenkamp, Antitrust After Chicago, supra note 30;
Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 257 (2001); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and
Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 Antitrust L.J. 147 (2012); Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 411 (1997).
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flation in time of these parallel developments makes ascribing causation
particularly difficult. This difficulty is compounded, moreover, by the
even greater increase in economic citations in the 1990s and 2000s,
which may be attributable to consolidation of the economic approach to
antitrust law or, alternatively, to an increasingly conservative Court. Relying on citation data alone, the only thing that can be said for certain is
that law and economics citations have definitely increased. Understanding why requires a broader analysis of additional characteristics of the
Court’s antitrust cases.
3. Economic Arguments
Citations to law and economics scholarship increased over the last
several decades, but were these citations necessarily tied to substantive
economic arguments? Perhaps not—examining Court opinions, party
and amici briefs, and other case documents reveals that Justices and
counsel often use legal-economic citations as a form of “window dressing,” typically to bolster traditional legal arguments with additional (if
40
superficial) academic support. It is rarer to encounter substantive arguments that are genuinely based on economic theory, as opposed to the
application of precedent to facts that characterizes traditional legal reasoning. Thus, the prevalence of economic arguments, and whether this
prevalence has increased over time, is another important measure of the
role of economics in antitrust law.
For purposes of this analysis, an opinion or brief was coded as containing an “economic argument” if it included any specific, detailed, and
relatively self-contained argument that economic theory compelled a particular decision outcome. As with the citation analysis above, no distinction was drawn between “conservative” (or market-based) and “liberal”
(or interventionist) economic analysis. The coding scale was strictly binary—an opinion or brief was classified as either containing an economic
argument or not. As is typical in legal practice, many opinions and briefs
contained multiple, independent arguments in support of a given decision outcome. If just one of these arguments was economic in nature, the
opinion or brief was coded as containing an economic argument. On the
other hand, passing references to economic scholarship (i.e., window
dressing) were insufficient—to qualify, the argument must have been relatively developed. Overall, the essential distinction that I attempted to
draw was between fundamentally legal arguments, grounded in the application of legal rules (even if buttressed by economic citations), and fun-

40

See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495
U.S. 328 (1990), at 19–22 (citing Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner to argue for
antitrust liability due to vertical maximum price fixing).
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damentally economic arguments, grounded in the application of economic
41
theory.
Reflecting (and befitting) its nature as a legal institution, the
Court’s use of economic arguments has been relatively infrequent. Figure
5 shows the percentage of majority opinions containing at least one economic argument, by term:
Figure 5. Percentage of Majority Opinions Containing
Economic Arguments, by Term
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Although there is a slight upward trend over time, the Court’s use of
economic arguments can be best described as sporadic. One’s impression
after reading all the cases in the database is that many Justices have been
hesitant to engage in explicitly economic arguments, preferring to justify
their decisions in the traditional terms of legal precedent. Even though
the Court has become increasingly likely to cite law and economics
scholarship (see Figure 2), these citations often provide ancillary support
for conventional, precedent-based legal arguments. At least with respect
42
to Supreme Court opinions, antitrust appears more law than economics.
A somewhat different picture emerges from party and amicus briefs.
Beginning with the parties, Figure 6 shows the percentage of cases in

41

Obviously, this was often a subjective determination. Even when using
consistent criteria, it is not always easy to differentiate a “legal” from an “economic”
argument. Given my aim of distinguishing between “mere” legal-economic citations
and substantive economic arguments—as well as the prevalence of casual, nonsubstantive economic rhetoric in antitrust cases—my standard for what qualified as an
economic argument was fairly strict.
42
See supra Figure 5.
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which plaintiffs and defendants presented economic arguments in their
(1) initial brief, (2) reply brief (if applicable), or (3) supplemental brief
(if applicable), for each term:
Figure 6. Percentage of Cases Featuring Economic
Arguments by Plaintiffs and Defendants, by Term
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The party data is also sporadic, with significant variation year to year.
Figure 6 clearly shows, however, that defendants have used economic arguments more often than plaintiffs. This pattern, visible in the bar graph,
is even more evident from reading the briefs themselves. When read side
by side, the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ briefs in many important antitrust
cases reveal a striking contrast of differing legal strategies.
These differences are observable in some of the Court’s most pivotal
antitrust decisions. Beginning in the 1970s, the Court overturned or significantly weakened many of its prior holdings as to the per se illegality of
43
a wide variety of market practices, including vertical restraints, tying ar44
45
rangements, and exclusionary refusals to deal. In many of these cases,
plaintiffs’ counsel constructed their arguments in a straightforward, tra43

See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
44
See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 (2006);
Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27–29 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 621–22 (1977).
45
See, e.g., Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1998);
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297
(1985).
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ditional legal fashion. These arguments often proceeded by (1) citing the
relevant per se rule, as articulated in prior Court precedent, (2) applying
the rule to the facts of the case, and (3) concluding that the defendant’s
46
conduct was per se illegal. Only rarely did plaintiffs’ counsel make any
rigorous effort to explain why prohibition of the defendant’s conduct
would benefit the broader economy. Defendants’ counsel, on the other
hand, often took a far more economic approach, explicitly arguing that
47
their clients’ practices promoted consumer welfare. These economic
arguments invited the Court to reconsider its prior holdings, and to substitute economic theory for the judicial principle of stare decisis.
This significant disconnect between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ arguments speaks to the transitional nature of the period. In certain cases,
the differences between the parties are so pronounced that they seem to
48
be arguing past each other. Since most of these cases were victories for
the defendant, the dogged reliance of plaintiffs’ counsel on precedent
seems misguided, at least in hindsight. In fairness to plaintiffs’ counsel, it
is difficult to name any other area of law in which the Court has been so
willing to disregard stare decisis. Who could have predicted that economic arguments would so consistently trump established Court precedent?
But to invoke Justice Holmes, if “prophecies of what the courts will do in
49
fact, and nothing more pretentious” is what is meant by the law, then
antitrust defendants may have had the benefit of better, more prophetic
lawyers. Whether defendants’ counsel were more adept at responding to
the Court’s economic concerns, or whether defendants’ economic arguments were what led the Court to reexamine its prior holdings, is a question taken up in Part II.C below.
I turn now to amicus briefs, in which economic arguments have become the most prevalent. Figure 7 shows the annual percentage of cases
in which at least one amicus brief supporting the plaintiff or the defendant contained an economic argument:

46

Plaintiff’s brief in Fortner is a prime example—the brief focuses on establishing
a per se tying violation under the Sherman Act, without engaging the underlying
policy rationale (or lack thereof) of the per se rule. See Brief for the Respondent at
19, Fortner, 429 U.S. at 610 (No. 75-853), 1976 WL 194625.
47
See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 49–60, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No.
76-15), 1976 WL 181222.
48
See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. 2; Fortner, 429 U.S. 610.
49
O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460–61(1897).
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Figure 7. Percentage of Cases in which at Least One Amicus
Curiae Brief Includes an Economic Argument, by Term
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Figure 7 shows a major increase, first with respect to pro-defendant amici,
and followed by pro-plaintiff amici. Much of this increase was due to increasing amicus filings per case—while there were zero amicus filings for
several years during the 1950s, by the 1990s, ten or more amicus filings
per antitrust case had become the norm. Simply as a matter of probability, the higher the number of amicus briefs submitted per case, the greater the likelihood that any one of them would include an economic argument. This is not to say that the level of economic sophistication of the
“average” amicus brief remained unchanged, however. As discussed in
Part II.B.2 above, the advent of recurrent amicus filings by business
groups, policy institutes, and academic scholars meant that the overall
content of amicus briefs became increasingly economic over the period.
Another recurrent amicus contributing to this process was the U.S. government. Although the Department of Justice had been sporadically involved in private antitrust litigation for decades, its participation as amicus curiae significantly increased during the 1980s. Under the framework
of the “Private Action Project,” a program initiated by William F. Baxter
(Assistant Attorney General for antitrust under the first Reagan administration), the Department sought to use amicus filings to systematically
50
influence the direction of antitrust law. Under this program, Supreme
Court cases in which the existing state of the law could be clarified or
improved (according to the standards of the Reagan administration)
50

See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661, 700 (1982).
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were identified by the Department’s Antitrust Division. Department attorneys then drafted and submitted amicus briefs advocating particular
decision outcomes. Given the powerful influence of the Chicago School
within the Reagan-era Antitrust Division, these briefs regularly featured
highly economic, market-based policy arguments. The Department’s arguments often extended beyond the immediate case at hand, explicitly
requesting that the Court overturn or modify established antitrust prece51
dents. Together, each of these three developments—increasing numbers of amicus briefs, the increasingly economic content of individual
briefs, and the increasingly aggressive economic advocacy of the U.S.
government—amplified the volume of economic arguments to which the
Supreme Court was repeatedly exposed.
To summarize, what do these statistical patterns tell us about changes in U.S. antitrust law? At a basic level, they provide confirmation that
market-based Court decisions, law and economics citations, and the use
of economic arguments have all increased since 1950. At a more granular
level, they also show that parties and amici have engaged in economic arguments more often than the Court, and that defendants have historically used economic arguments more often than plaintiffs. Although the data suggest intriguing relationships between these developments and the
timing of Supreme Court appointments, case-level statistics only reveal so
much regarding the central issue of causality. Was the market-based shift
in the Court’s decisions a response to economic arguments? Or were the
economic arguments of parties and amici a response to the Court’s market-based decisions? Resolving this puzzle requires looking beyond the
Court as a unitary institution and examining the role of individual Justices in the changing direction of antitrust jurisprudence.
C. Justice-Level Patterns
The statistics presented in Part II.B above bear out the conventional
wisdom—that the substance and rhetoric of antitrust law has become increasingly economic over time. The question of what caused this shift
remains difficult to answer, however. The timing of the change in the
Court’s decisions suggests judicial appointments played an important
role (see Figure 1), though without additional evidence it is difficult to
say more. Only an investigation of the voting behavior of individual Jus-

51

For discussion of the Private Action Project, see Eisner, supra note 3, at 207–
10. There is reason to believe the government has been a particularly influential
amicus curiae. Among the cases in the database, the Court’s ruling was consistent
with the government’s recommendation in 84% of cases in which the government
submitted an amicus brief. If one only considers cases during the Reagan years, this
figure increases to 90%. For additional discussion of the government’s role and
influence as amicus curiae, see generally John Thorne, A Short Note on Government
Amicus Briefs in Antitrust Cases, 2004 A.B.A. Antitrust Sec. 1–3.
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tices can reveal the vote-specific factors that shape the Court’s aggregate
decision record.
This Part II.C provides such an investigation: by comparing the votes
of individual Justices against selected case-level variables, it seeks to determine whether Justices’ voting decisions were influenced by economic
arguments. As detailed below, the means of conducting this inquiry are
twofold. The first method was simply to assess whether individual Justices’
voting records changed over time. The second was to compare the voting
records of individual Justices in (1) cases in which one or both parties
made an economic argument against (2) cases in which neither party
made an economic argument. My findings indicate that while the antitrust views of certain Justices did evolve over time, economic arguments
did not generally “convert” Justices from their preexisting views.
1. Individual Justices’ Voting Over Time
As discussed in Part II.B.1, the antitrust decisions of the Supreme
Court have become increasingly market-oriented. Since Supreme Court
decisions are determined by majority voting, fully understanding this increase requires tracking individual votes. From this perspective, the basic
inquiry becomes whether the shift in the Court’s antitrust record was due
to (1) changes in the voting patterns of incumbent Justices, or (2) the
replacement of incumbent Justices with more conservative appointees.
The simplest method of addressing this question is determining whether
individual Justices’ voting patterns changed over time. Such a determination is possible with data derived from the U.S. Supreme Court Database,
which includes the votes of individual Justices for every case in the collection. After coding the Court decisions in my own database as either market-based or interventionist, it was straightforward to classify individual
votes according to the same schema: For market-based decisions, votes
with the majority (including concurrences) were coded as market-based,
while votes with the dissent(s) (if any) were coded as interventionist. Similarly, for interventionist decisions, votes with the majority (including
concurrences) were coded as interventionist, while votes with the dis52
sent(s) (if any) were coded as market-based.
Whether these votes shifted over time speaks to the question of academic influence given the temporal increase in economic references in
opinions, briefs, and other case documents. Since economic references
increased after the 1960s, a corresponding increase in market-based votes
on the part of a given Justice would tend to suggest that exposure to economic ideas had influenced the Justice’s voting decisions. On the other

52

There are a few odd exceptions in the database. In certain cases, based on my
reading of the opinions, both the majority and dissenting votes were coded the same
(i.e., market-based or interventionist), or concurring votes were coded differently
from the majority.
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hand, if a Justice’s voting remained essentially unchanged, it would tend
to suggest the absence of influence.
The voting data for individual Justices indicate that while certain
Justices’ antitrust views did evolve over time, most Justices arrived on the
Court with stable, preexisting antitrust views. The data also indicate that
later appointees to the Court were more market-oriented than their predecessors. To convey these patterns visually, Figure 8 shows the annual
53
54
percentage of cases in which each Justice cast market-based votes.

Figure 8. Antitrust Voting Records of Individual Justices Over Time
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Figure 8 includes each Justice who served for at least 10 terms between 1950
and 2010 in which at least one antitrust case was decided by the Court. This excludes
Justices Reed, Jackson, Burton, Minton, Vinson, Whittaker, Goldberg, Fortas,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito, who each served for less than 10 terms between
1950 and 2010 in which at least one antitrust case was decided. The timescales for
each chart in Figure 8 are different, given that each Justice served for different
periods of time. Voting information for terms before 1950 and after 2010 is not
included in my database, and therefore not shown in Figure 8.
54
Cases in which the particular Justice did not participate are excluded from
analysis.
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As seen in Figure 8, while most Justices’ voting records remained
relatively stable over their tenures, a few Justices’ voting records became
increasingly market-oriented. The clearest and most interesting example
of this phenomenon is Justice Brennan. Brennan’s antitrust record is
particularly notable for two reasons: not only is he the Justice whose antitrust record changed the most—from very interventionist in the 1950s to
relatively market-based by the 1980s—he is also widely considered one of
the twentieth-century Court’s most important liberals. Indeed, even as
Brennan’s antitrust record was moving in an increasingly market-based
direction, his overall voting record (including all types of cases) was only
55
becoming more and more liberal. This divergence between Brennan’s
antitrust record and his record in other types of cases indicates that his
antitrust views were not simply a function of his broader ideology. Given
the time period of Brennan’s tenure—covering the most significant
changes in antitrust practice—it may also suggest his growing acceptance
of parties’ and amici’s economic arguments.

55

As measured by the commonly-used Martin-Quinn score, Brennan’s overall
judicial ideology became increasingly liberal over his tenure. See Andrew D. Martin &
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the
U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134 (2002).
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As intriguing as such developments may be, any changes in the voting behavior of individual Justices are far outweighed by the greater effect of turnover in the composition of the Court. Each and every Justice
appointed after Thurgood Marshall cast a higher percentage of marketbased votes than the departing Justice they replaced. Over the course of
successive appointments, this led to a stable majority of market-based
votes in most Supreme Court antitrust cases. Significantly, this phenomenon is not merely a function of party identity. When the analysis includes every Justice in the database, it becomes clear that all recent appointees, both Democratic and Republican, cast greater percentages of
market-based votes than nearly every Justice predating the Nixon admin56
istration. This can be seen in Figure 9, which provides the total percentage of market-based votes cast by each Justice serving between 1950 and
2009:
Figure 9. Antitrust Voting Records of Individual Justices
Black
Reed
Frankfurter
Douglas
Jackson
Burton
Minton
Vinson
Clark
Warren
Harlan
Whittaker
Brennan
Goldberg
Fortas
Stewart

22.31%
50%
66.07%
22.3%
60%
65%
50%
55.56%
30.86%
18.56%
64.71%
71.43%
34.91%
52.63%
23.08%
60.16%

White
Marshall
Burger
Blackmun
Rehnquist
Powell
Stevens
O’Connor
Scalia
Kennedy
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer
Roberts
Alito

38.3%
47.37%
70.67%
63.22%
68.13%
76.67%
62.65%
74.47%
80.56%
71.88%
86.96%
77.27%
68.75%
75%
88.89%
83.33%

As Figure 9 shows, recent conservative appointees have been more likely
to cast market-based votes than prior conservative appointees, while recent liberal appointees have been more likely to cast market-based votes
than prior liberal appointees—as well as many prior conservative appointees! Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, current members of the Court’s
liberal wing, have more market-oriented voting records than both Justice
Harlan and Justice Stewart, historically considered antitrust conserva57
tives. If measured strictly in terms of antitrust decisions, the median Su-

56

The single exception being Justice Whittaker, who had an unusually brief
tenure on the Court and cast an unusually high percentage of market-based votes.
57
See supra Figure 9.
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preme Court Justice shifted significantly rightward since the early 1970s.
This phenomenon of later Court appointees—both Democrats and Republicans—casting higher percentages of market-based votes than their
immediate predecessors has been the single most important factor in the
Court’s changing antitrust jurisprudence.
2. Economic Arguments and Individual Justices’ Votes
Unfortunately, changes in Justices’ voting over time are only a crude
measure of the influence of economic arguments. In effect, time is serving as a proxy for the economization of antitrust arguments, hardly a
precise metric of the economic content of specific cases. Fortunately,
there is a more direct means of assessing the relationship between economic arguments and individual Justices’ votes: Using 2x2 contingency
tables, I compare, for each Justice, the percentage of cases in which the
Justice cast a market-based vote in (1) cases in which either party made at
least one economic argument and (2) cases in which neither party made
an economic argument. This comparison allows direct assessment of the
statistical relationship between economic arguments and individual Justices’ votes.
The results are fascinating. In short, the effect of the presence of
economic arguments on individual Justices depends on the particular
Justice’s overall antitrust record: Justices who were more likely to cast
market-based votes in all cases were even more likely to cast market-based
votes in cases featuring economic arguments. Justices who were more
likely to cast interventionist votes in all cases, however, were even less likely to cast market-based votes in cases featuring economic arguments. In
other words, the presence of economic arguments in antitrust cases
seems to have an amplifying effect on Justices’ preexisting policy views.
58
These results hold for nearly every Justice in the dataset.
Figure 10 presents 2x2 contingency tables for the same Justices in59
cluded in Figure 8, reporting the Justice-specific relationships between
(1) the presence or absence of at least one economic argument in the
60
parties’ briefs (whether made by the defendant, plaintiff, or both) and
61
(2) whether the Justice cast a market-based or interventionist vote:
58

The exceptions being Justice Souter and (significantly) Justice Brennan. Three
early Justices, Burton, Minton, and Reed, cast market-based votes in approximately
50% of total cases, but were significantly less likely to cast market-based votes in cases
featuring economic arguments. This may be due to the fact that economic arguments
(while rare) tended to support interventionist outcomes in the early 1950s.
59
That is, Justices who served at least 10 terms between 1950 and 2010 in which
at least one antitrust case was decided by the Court.
60
Including the initial merits briefs, as well as reply briefs and supplemental
briefs, if any.
61
In social science research, contingency tables are often used to assess
relationships between categorical variables. When used with sample data, they are
typically accompanied by tests of statistical significance (most often the chi-square
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Figure 10. Individual Justices’ Votes by Presence or Absence of Economic
Arguments
Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)
Total

Black
Market-Based Vote

73.27%

26.73%

100%

100%

0%

100%

77.69%

22.31%

100%

Frankfurter
Interventionist Vote
Market-Based Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)
Total

Total

63.83%

100%

22.22%

77.78%

100%

33.93%

66.07%

100%

Total

Douglas
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

73.50%

26.50%

100%

95.83%

4.17%

100%

77.30%

22.70%

100%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

36.17%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

Clark
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

64.62%

35.38%

100%

87.50%

12.50%

100%

69.14%

30.86%

100%

test). For this analysis, I have not included significance tests because the data are not
a sample—they encompass the entire population of individual votes within my period
of interest. Significance testing is inapplicable because there is no statistical inference
to be made. Whether substantively significant or not (a question for the reader to
decide), the data speak for themselves. That said, if one were to perform two-tailed
chi-square tests on the data in Figure 10, the results for Justice Black would be
statistically significant at p ≤ 0.01; the results for Justices Douglas, Burger, and
O’Connor would be statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05; and the results for Justices
Harlan, Powell, Rehnquist, and Scalia would be statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1.
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Interventionist Vote

No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)
Total

Total

21.79%

100%

94.74%

5.26%

100%

81.44%

18.56%

100%

Total

Total

100%

17.65%

82.35%

100%

36.47%

63.53%

100%

Total

Brennan
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

67.46%

32.54%

100%

58.14%

41.86%

100%

65.09%

34.91%

100%

Stewart
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

43.75%

56.25%

100%

25.93%

74.07%

100%

39.84%

60.16%

100%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

58.82%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Harlan
Market-Based Vote

41.18%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

78.21%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Warren
Market-Based Vote
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White
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

60.19%

39.81%

100%

66.67%

33.33%

100%

61.7%

38.3%

100%
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No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)
Total

Total

Marshall
Market-Based Vote

Total

100%

52%

48%

100%

52.63%

47.37%

100%

Burger
Market-Based Vote

Total

63.46%

100%

13.04%

86.96%

100%

29.33%

70.67%

100%

Total

Grand Total

43.33%

56.67%

100%

22.22%

77.78%

100%

36.78%

63.22%

100%

Grand Total

39.06%

60.94%

100%

14.81%

85.19%

100%

31.87%

68.13%

100%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

36.54%

Rehnquist
Interventionist Vote
Market-Based Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

47.14%

Blackmun
Interventionist Vote
Market-Based Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)
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52.86%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)
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Powell
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

32.5%

67.5%

100%

5%

95%

100%

23.33%

76.67%

100%
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No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)
Total

Stevens
Market-Based Vote

Total

60%

100%

32.14%

67.86%

100%

37.35%

62.65%

100%

Total

60%

100%

0%

100%

100%

25.53%

74.47%

100%

Total

Total

Grand Total

72.00%

100%

0.00%

100.00%

100%

19.44%

80.56%

100%

Kennedy
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

34.78%

65.22%

100%

11.11%

88.89%

100%

28.13%

71.88%

100%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Scalia
Market-Based Vote

28.00%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

40%

Interventionist Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

Grand Total

40%

O’Connor
Interventionist Vote
Market-Based Vote
No Economic
Argument
Economic
Argument(s)

[Vol. 21:1

Souter
Market-Based Vote

Grand Total

6.67%

93.33%

100%

25.00%

75.00%

100%

13.04%

86.96%

100%
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Thomas
Market-Based Vote
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Grand Total

35.71%

64.29%

100%

0.00%

100.00%

100%

22.73%

77.27%

100%

As these tables show, the direction of the effect of economic arguments on a particular Justice’s voting decisions has been dependent on
62
the Justice’s overall antitrust record. Justice Powell, for example (one of
the most conservative Justices in economic cases), cast a market-based
vote in 67.5% of cases that did not feature economic arguments, but in
95% of cases that did feature economic arguments. For Justices with interventionist voting records, economic arguments had the opposite effect. Justice Warren, for example, cast a market-based vote in 21.79% of
cases that did not feature economic arguments, but in only 5.26% of cases that did feature economic arguments. This phenomenon is also seen
in the lack of effect on Justices in the center: Justice Marshall, with the
most centrist record in Figure 10, appears to have been unaffected by
economic arguments either way. Marshall cast a market-based vote in
47.37% of all cases, and cast almost the same percentage of market-based
votes in cases that did and did not feature economic arguments. With
Marshall, there seem to have been no preexisting convictions for eco63
nomic arguments to challenge or reinforce.
Brennan is among the very few Justices whose record is inconsistent
with this pattern. While Brennan cast a market-based vote in 35.91% of
62

There is also an alternative interpretation of the data in Figure 10. Not all
antitrust cases are equal in terms of the relevance of economic analysis to their
decision, as some antitrust cases turn on technical legal issues with minimal economic
implications. It is therefore possible that the presence of economic arguments in the
parties’ briefs is a proxy for the economic nature of the underlying case. Under this
interpretation, the Justices’ voting patterns in Figure 10 were influenced by the
nature of the cases themselves, rather than by the manner in which they were argued
by the parties.
While the nature of the cases may be a lurking variable in Figure 10, I doubt it is
the primary explanation. Since the distribution of antitrust cases with highly
economic implications has assumedly remained stable over time, but the frequency of
economic arguments has significantly increased, it seems unlikely that economic
arguments are a close proxy for underlying case content.
63
This is consistent with perceptions of Marshall as an antitrust moderate who
made voting decisions on a non-ideological, case-by-case basis. Given Marshall’s
background, interest, and expertise in constitutional law, some commentators have
portrayed him as comparatively disinterested in antitrust law, and thus particularly
open to the influence of his law clerks and fellow Justices. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic,
Antitrust Decision Making and the Supreme Court: Perspectives from the Thurgood Marshall
Papers, 42 Antitrust Bull. 93, 108–11 (1997).
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all antitrust cases in which he voted, he cast a market-based vote in
41.86% of cases featuring economic arguments and only 32.54% of cases
64
that did not feature economic arguments. As discussed in Part II.C.1,
Brennan is also the Justice whose antitrust record changed most over
time, becoming increasingly market-oriented even as his overall record
became increasingly liberal. If many Justices have joined the Court with
relatively fixed antitrust views, Brennan may be the exception that proves
the rule: a Justice whose perspective on antitrust was reshaped, postappointment, by developments in academic scholarship.
D. Summary and Interpretation
Examining both case-level patterns and the voting records of individual Justices reveals the market-based shift in antitrust jurisprudence
was not the result of a single cause. As with many historical developments, it was shaped by multiple, complementary factors. That said, the
most immediate and most important of these factors was turnover on the
Court. The Nixon appointments, in particular, had a clear effect on the
Court’s decision making. Once established on the Court, the Nixon appointees constituted a stable pro-defendant voting bloc, and were able to
secure many pivotal antitrust decisions by garnering the support of their
65
moderate colleagues. While these Republican Justices tended to be
66
highly receptive to economic arguments, their receptiveness appears to
have been due to political attitudes formed earlier in their careers, rather
than to any post-appointment economic enlightenment. With the possible exception of Justice Burger (whose market-based voting increased
somewhat), each of these Justices’ antitrust voting records remained sta67
ble over time, even as the content of party and amicus briefs became in68
creasingly economic. At the same time, incumbent Justices holding in69
terventionist views were generally unswayed by economic appeals. In
terms of individual votes, it appears that preexisting political attitudes
have been more important than economic arguments.
The Court’s embrace of market-based economics cannot be explained purely in political terms, however. As discussed in Part II.C.1
above, certain liberal Justices of the older generation (most notably Justice Brennan) became more likely to support market-based decisions
over the span of their tenures. This did not correspond with any rightward shift in their overall voting records (in the case of Brennan, quite
the opposite). Even more significant were the market-based antitrust
64
65
66
67
68
69

See supra Figures 9 & 10.
See supra Figure 8.
See supra Figure 10.
See supra Figure 8.
See supra Figures 2–7.
See supra Figure 10.
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views of newly-appointed Justices: By the 1990s, the market-based approach to antitrust law had transcended partisan divisions, characterizing
70
the Court’s liberal wing as well as its conservatives. Indeed, nearly every
member of the current Court—Democrats as well as Republicans—would
be considered an antitrust conservative by the standards of the prior
71
era. This development, more than any other, accounts for the current
direction of antitrust law.
This fundamental shift in judicial attitudes is difficult to explain.
Fully answering the question of why recent Justices, both liberal and conservative, have accepted the market-based approach to antitrust law
would require examining the broader influence of economic thought on
American legal culture. Such an ambitious inquiry is—unfortunately—
beyond the scope of this Article. A qualitative analysis of major antitrust
cases can demonstrate how this transformation progressed, however. The
following Part III presents such an analysis in view of the statistical trends
discussed above, examining three major cases from three distinct phases
in postwar antitrust law.
III. CASE STUDIES
As the years have passed, the number of law and economics citations
by the Court, litigants, and amici curiae has significantly increased, arguments are more frequently cast in specifically economic terms, and the
Court has become increasingly accepting of the policy conclusions of law
72
and economics. Although statistical data provides a useful view of a legal
field in transformation, it fails to convey the full flavor of these changes,
which can only be drawn from reading the individual cases: the gradual
yet inexorable shift in the assumptions, rhetoric, and argumentative
strategies of nearly all legal actors involved. In order to convey these qualitative changes, this Part III presents a closer analysis of three landmark
antitrust cases, each drawn from a distinct period in postwar antitrust law:
Brown Shoe (1962), decided during the height of the Supreme Court’s in70

See supra Figure 8.
See supra Figure 9. The only potential exception is Justice Kagan, the newest
member of the Court, who has been involved in too few antitrust cases for an
accurate assessment of her views. Even Justice Sotomayor has established a record as a
moderate in business cases (based largely on her tenure on the Second Circuit),
comfortable with the use of economic theory, particularly in antitrust cases. See Dana
M. Muir et al., Justice Sotomayor on the Supreme Court: A Boon for Business?, 4 Va. L. Bus.
Rev. 187, 198–99 (2009). At the time of this writing, little can be said of the future
replacement for the late Justice Scalia, one of the Court’s most consistent antitrust
conservatives.
72
See supra Figures 2–7 (showing the increase in law and economics citations);
Figure 6 (showing the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs and defendants
presented economic arguments); Figure 5 (showing the percentage of majority
opinions containing at least one economic argument).
71
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terventionism, Sylvania (1977), signaling the transition to market-based
antitrust jurisprudence, and Brooke Group (1993), representing the current economic paradigm.
Each of these cases is famous (or infamous, depending on one’s
perspective) for establishing legal precedents and policy assumptions that
would influence antitrust law years to follow. Rather than focusing on
their doctrinal significance—ground well covered by prior scholars—the
analysis below provides a more descriptive, “externalistic” account of
these cases’ decisions, including the legal strategies of the various parties,
the decision-making process of the Court, and broader changes in the
historical context that may have influenced their respective outcomes.
Viewing these cases as representative examples of the trends identified in
Part II can help to illuminate abstract statistics that might otherwise lack
immediate impact.
A. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States—Equalitarianism Versus Efficiency
Of the three cases selected for review, Brown Shoe represents the “inhospitality” era of traditional, interventionist antitrust. As such, it also has
the least remaining legal force. A long-standing target of criticism by le73
gal and economic scholars, its central holding has been largely aban74
doned, though never formally overruled. Brown Shoe endured as controlling precedent for decades following its decision, however, and remains
75
controversial today. In the words of Robert Bork (writing in 1978): “It is
not merely a bad case, it is also a trend setter—as if the poems of E. A.
76
Guest had determined the course of modern literature.”
Brown Shoe involved a merger challenged by the U.S. government
under amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the primary federal anti73

See, e.g., Dominick T. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a
Policy Failure 245–46 (1982); Bork, supra note 1, at 198–216; Harlan M. Blake &
William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 422,
455–57 (1965); Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of
Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 325, 328–29 (1968); Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 302–12
(1975).
74
Brown Shoe’s legal significance was weakened by a series of pro-defendant
Clayton Act decisions in the 1970s, and by the Department of Justice’s hands-off
merger enforcement policies in the 1980s. With little likelihood of strong
government enforcement, the anti-merger provisions of Clayton Act Section 7 (the
specific statute under which the Brown Shoe case was brought) have faded in
importance. For a discussion of Brown Shoe’s legacy, see Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth
M. Vorrasi, The Remarkable 50-Year Legacy of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
Antitrust, Spring 2012, at 47. For a discussion of merger enforcement policy under
the Reagan administration, see Eisner, supra note 3, at 195–97.
75
Skitol and Vorrasi, supra note 74, at 47.
76
Bork, supra note 1, at 210.
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77

merger statute. In 1955, Brown Shoe Company, Inc., a large, integrated
shoe manufacturer, had acquired by merger G. R. Kinney Company, Inc.,
a nationwide shoe retailer. Five years prior, under the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act of 1950, Congress had expanded the Clayton Act to cover
asset acquisitions as well as stock acquisitions, an amendment intended to
78
bring mergers under the act’s purview. The government challenged the
Brown-Kinney merger pursuant to this amendment, claiming its effect
“may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in the shoe industry, the relevant legal standard under the Clay79
ton Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled for the government, despite the facts that the combined, nationwide market share of Brown and
80
Kinney was only 4.4% of national shoe manufacturing and only 2.3% of
81
national retail sales —hardly monopoly levels. The decision has since
been pilloried as an excessive restraint on mergers and acquisitions,
which explicitly protected less competitive firms from larger, more cost82
efficient rivals. What many of these criticisms fail to acknowledge is that
Brown Shoe was consistent with the antitrust thinking of its time, and that
it faithfully implemented Congress’s agenda in passing the CellerKefauver amendments.
1. The Court’s Opinion
The social and political concerns animating the Brown Shoe decision
are far removed from the narrow economic criteria that dominate antitrust today. The logic of the Court’s opinion, authored by Chief Justice
83
Warren, focused on preserving the decentralized structure of the American shoe industry—characterized by a large number of small, independent manufacturers and retailers—from the incipient threat of powerful
84
manufactures dominating the retail market. The issue of economic effi-

77

Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2012)).
78
Id. Although the Clayton Act’s original reference to acquisitions of “stock or
other share capital” arguably included mergers even before 1950, it was not generally
interpreted as regulating mergers until following the Celler-Kefauver amendments.
79
Id.
80
Brief for Appellant at 128, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962) (No. 4).
81
Id. at 174.
82
Armentano, supra note 73, at 245–46; Bork, supra note 1, at 215–16; Blake &
Jones, supra note 73, at 456–57; Kauper, supra note 73, at 328–29; Posner, supra note
73, at 302–12.
83
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 294. The decision was unanimous except for a
partial dissent by Justice Harlan, who believed the Court lacked proper jurisdiction.
Id. at 357 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84
The Brown Shoe decision is noted (and criticized) for establishing the legal
standard that “tendencies toward concentration in industry are to be curbed in their
incipiency” under Section 7. Id. at 346 (majority opinion).
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ciency, obliquely raised in the Court’s opinion, was subordinated to the
85
political goal of halting a “rising tide of economic concentration.”
Assessing the potential consequences of the merger, the Court
86
found that in a context of increasing industry consolidation, Brown’s
acquisition of Kinney and its vertical integration into retailing would
“foreclose” part of the retail market to competing manufacturers (who
would no longer be able to sell to Kinney), as well as part of the manufactured shoe market to competing retailers (who would no longer be able
87
to buy from Brown). Drawing on the legislative history of the CellerKefauver amendments, the Court held that by “foreclosing the competitors of either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to
them,” the Brown-Kinney merger would deprive competing rivals of “a
88
fair opportunity to compete.” The Court predicted Brown would “force”
its product upon Kinney, thus eliminating Kinney as a competitive factor
89
in the marketplace. Its condemnation of this outcome was not based in
economic theory, however. In particular, the Court cited no theory explaining why Brown, assumedly a profit-maximizing enterprise, would
pursue such a policy unless it created efficiencies allowing Brown to un90
dersell its competitors. This style of opinion—marked by ad hoc economic reasoning from the bench and suspicion of aggressive business
91
practices—was typical of the Warren Court. Although the Brown Shoe
opinion included six citations to legal-economic scholarship, each of
these citations supported interventionist conclusions, and none spoke di92
rectly to efficiency or consumer prices. At the time Brown Shoe was decided, economic harm to competitors—in and of itself—tended to establish antitrust liability, with little thought to the economic consequences
born by the ultimate consumer.
Indeed, despite the Court’s concern over market foreclosure, evidence had been introduced that, following the acquisition, Brown continued to sell shoes to competing retailers and Kinney continued to buy
93
shoes from competing manufacturers —but that small, independent

85

Id. at 317.
Whether or not concentration in the shoe industry was actually increasing was
disputed by the parties. See Brief for the United States at 99, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S.
at 294 (No. 4); Brief for Appellant at 15, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S.at 294 (No. 4). The
Court accepted the government’s argument that the Brown-Kinney merger
represented incipient industry consolidation.
87
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 328.
88
Id. at 324.
89
Id. at 332.
90
Id. at 330–32.
91
Id. at 331–33.
92
Id. at 312 n.19, 330 n.50, 332 nn.55–57, 334 n.61, 343 n.71.
93
Following the merger, Brown and Kinney continued to operate as separate
business units.
86
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firms had difficulty competing with the combined Brown-Kinney’s lower
94
prices. Acknowledging the possibility that large, integrated firms such as
Brown-Kinney might provide lower prices to consumers, the Court explicitly rejected consumer welfare as a controlling factor in Section 7 cas95
es. Turning again to the legislative history, the Court concluded that
Congress’s objectives in passing the Celler-Kefauver amendments had
been to protect small businesses, preserve economic autonomy, and
maintain the existing “economic way of life” by halting trends toward in96
dustrial consolidation at their earliest incipiency. To the extent these
goals conflicted with minimizing consumer prices, the Court determined
97
that preventing concentration was Congress’s priority. In a famous passage, the Court at once recognized and deprecated the value of economic efficiency under the antitrust laws:
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentraliza98
tion. We must give effect to that decision.

Whatever the economic merits of this ruling, and despite impas99
sioned arguments to the contrary, the Court’s interpretation of Congressional intent was undoubtedly correct. The legislative history of the
Celler-Kefauver amendments (and of the original Clayton Act itself) is
replete with unambiguous statements of Congress’s anti-bigness, anticoncentration agenda, and of its goal of halting even the earliest trends
100
toward economic centralization. The Court’s interpretation was also
consistent with the mainstream academic views of the era. Antitrust was
seen by many legal academics as an important check on economic power,
94

See Brief for United States, supra note 86, at 120–22.
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 342, n.69.
96
Id. at 333.
97
Id. at 346.
98
Id.
99
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 1, at 200. Throughout his academic career, Bork
argued that Congress’s primary objective in passing the antitrust laws was to maximize
consumer welfare, rather than to protect small businesses and prevent economic
concentration. In the Section 7 context (among others), this argument strains
credulity. For a more measured critique of the Supreme Court’s use of legislative
history in the Brown Shoe case, see Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1326–28 (1965).
100
Thomas J. Horton, Fixing Merger Litigation “Fixes”: Reforming the Litigation of
Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 165, 191–94
(2010); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1, 23–26 (1982); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1051, 1060–65 (1979).
95
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an equalitarian viewpoint complemented by the industrial organization
101
economics of the period. At the time Brown Shoe was decided, Harvardstyle structuralism was the dominant approach in antitrust economics,
while the revisionist arguments of the Chicago School remained underdeveloped and obscure. The immaturity of the Chicago School in 1962 is
evidenced by the surprising fact that the Court cited George Stigler in
102
support of its interventionist, anti-concentration holding. The lack of
alternatives to traditional, interventionist antitrust was also reflected in
the parties’ briefs, in which the market-based arguments that would characterize later antitrust cases are conspicuously absent.
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments
The Court’s opinion generally followed the arguments of the government, which were even more explicit in prioritizing equalitarianism
over efficiency. Most of the government’s arguments focused on Congress’s anti-bigness agenda and the attendant importance of halting mo103
nopoly in its earliest incipiency. While the government’s brief included
a total of five legal-economic citations (generally supporting its interventionist theory of the case), efficiency and consumer prices were peripher104
al to its core arguments.
The contradictions between the government’s arguments and the
consumer welfare model are striking. Employing a legal strategy that
would seem perverse by the standards of current antitrust thinking, the
government repeatedly cited Brown-Kinney’s advantages in satisfying
consumer demand as reasons to invalidate the merger. For example, according to the government, the merger was unfair to Brown-Kinney’s
competitors because the combined business could “sell its own product at
a significantly lower price than the nonintegrated independent retail105
er.” The government also cited Brown’s own justifications for the mer-

101

See Emanuel Celler, What’s Wrong with “What Is Wrong with the Antitrust Laws?”,
8 Antitrust Bull. 571, 593 (1963); Alfred E. Kahn, Market Power and Economic
Growth: Guides to Public Policy, 8 Antitrust Bull. 531, 538 (1963).
102
Two of the Court’s six legal-economic citations were to a 1955 Stigler article
on the preventative role of merger policy. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 332 n.56, 334
n.61. The government also cited Stigler in its merits brief. Brief for United States,
supra note 86, at 97 n.35. Stigler would emerge in the 1960s as one of the leading
economists of the Chicago School, but his early work emphasized the economic
danger of industrial concentration. Although ironic in light of his later scholarship,
Stigler’s (fleeting) anti-bigness views were consistent with an early Chicago
intellectual tradition most fully expressed in the writing of Henry Simons. It was not
until the work of Aaron Director in the 1950s (and its propagation by Bork, Stigler,
and others in the 1960s) that Chicago became known for its free-market antitrust
perspective.
103
See Brief for United States, supra note 86, at 45.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 48.
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106

ger, including a smoother manufacturing-retail cycle; more effective
advertising and promotion; and greater flexibility to adjust styles, quality,
107
and prices, as additional evidence of the merger’s illegality.
During oral argument, the government (represented by Solicitor
General Archibald Cox) tied its case to a larger goal of preserving the
108
“economist’s classical free market.” This goal was expressed without any
reference to actual economics scholarship, however—classical or other109
wise. In any event, the economic consequences of the “classical free
market” seemed secondary within the logic of the government’s case to
110
Congress’s “social philosophy” of protecting small businesses. Citing
the language of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v.
111
F.T.C., the government argued that “[as amended Section 7] was under
consideration by Congress, it was duly appreciated that decentralized and
deconcentrated markets are often uneconomic and provide higher costs
and prices[,]” but that Congress chose to accept these costs to combat
112
“concentration of power.” Although this argument was an accurate
characterization of Congress’s legislative intent, it represented an economic perspective far removed from current antitrust thought. As discussed in the context of the Sylvania and Brooke Group cases below, it is
nearly inconceivable that a plaintiff would make such an argument today.
3. Defendant’s Arguments
Unlike the government’s arguments, the defendant’s arguments in
support of the merger gained little traction with the Court. This may
have been partly the result of a misguided legal strategy: defendant’s
113
counsel spent the majority of an over-200-page brief arguing that
Brown and Kinney were not competitors—and therefore their merger
did not threaten competition—because the two firms sold different varie114
ties of shoes in different price ranges. Although this argument was certainly relevant to the horizontal aspects of the case, it failed to impress
115
the Court, which rejected it almost out of hand. At a deeper level, de106

Brown’s president, Clark Gamble, testified as a witness at trial.
Brief for United States, supra note 86, at 120–22.
108
Transcript of Oral Argument (Part 1) at 1:16:42, Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) ((No. 4), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/
107

1961_4.
109

Id. at 1:16:06–1:19:38.
Id. at 1:36:26.
111
296 F.2d 800, 825 (9th Cir. 1961).
112
Transcript of Oral Argument (Part 1), supra note 108, at 1:37.
113
Brown’s lead attorney was Arthur Dean, of Sullivan & Cromwell—hardly
incompetent antitrust counsel.
114
Brief for Appellant, supra note 80, at 122.
115
Transcript of Oral Argument (Part 2) at :06–2:23, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at
294 (No. 4), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961. Defendant’s counsel
argued that the shoe market was actually comprised of a large number of distinct and
110
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fense counsel seemed unable to effectively convey why any merger should
be viewed by courts with anything besides hostility. This broader theoretical failure may have stemmed from an absence—at the time—of marketbased antitrust scholarship for defendant’s counsel to draw on.
116
At certain points in its briefs, the defense broached arguments
similar to those that would eventually become hallmarks of the Chicago
School, but without the aura of economic sophistication that academic
citations might have afforded. As an example, the defense argued that
the government’s case conflated injury to competitors with injury to competition, and that evidence of Brown’s competitive success was irrelevant to
establishing antitrust liability (themes common to later Chicago scholar117
ship). Despite the economic implications of this argument, however,
defendant’s briefs included no citations to law and economics scholar118
ship. Without the benefit of a theoretical model of how mergers could
promote economic efficiency, the defense was incapable of rebutting the
assumption that all mergers were competitively suspect. Ironically, the
defense went as far as to argue the merger would not achieve economic
benefits—even for Brown itself!—in an attempt to counter the govern119
ment’s claims as to Brown’s competitive advantages. Given the inability
of the defendant to coherently justify its own transaction, it is hardly surprising that it fared so poorly before the Court.
4. Summary
The Brown Shoe case is representative of its era in at least three key
respects: (1) the Court’s opinion focused on protecting competitors rather than maximizing consumer welfare, (2) the logic of the parties’ arguments did not rely on formal economic theory, and (3) neither the
Court’s opinion nor the parties’ briefs contained extensive citations to
120
law and economics scholarship. Although modern critics have deseparate submarkets (corresponding with different varieties of shoes and different
price ranges). The Court held that, for purposes of the case, there were only three
identifiable markets: men’s shoes, women’s shoes, and children’s shoes. Both Justice
Clark (concurring) and Justice Harlan (dissenting) would have taken an even stricter
approach, holding that the shoe industry was comprised of a single market.
116
The defendant submitted an initial brief and a reply brief.
117
Brief for Appellant, supra note 80; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 38, Brown Shoe
Co., 370 U.S. at 294 (No. 4). Interestingly, the Court’s statement that the Clayton Act
was meant to protect “competition, not competitors”—a phrase which would later
become a touchstone of modern antitrust—appears to have been drawn from the
initial brief of the defendant. It appears nowhere in the legislative history of the
Celler-Kefauver amendments.
118
Brief for Appellant, supra note 80.
119
Id. at 193.
120
At six and five citations respectively, the Court’s opinion and the plaintiff’s
merits brief were each above average for the era, but well below average for all cases
in the database. The defendant’s merits briefs included no law and economic
citations.

LCB_21_1_Article_4_Hutchison (Do Not Delete)

2017]

LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP

2/26/2017 12:20 PM

189

nounced Brown Shoe as economically naive, it is important to remember
that the decision reflected the mainstream antitrust views of the era. The
moderate, consensus nature of the Brown Shoe decision is underscored by
the facts that the government’s case was originally brought under a Re121
publican administration, that the Court’s opinion was authored by a
122
Republican Chief Justice, and that the decision on the merits was essen123
tially unanimous. Claims that the decision constituted a dramatic, activist overreach are both inaccurate and ahistorical.
Brown Shoe is also representative for another important reason: like
most antitrust cases of its era, it featured no involvement of amici curiae.
Amicus briefs were rarely submitted in antitrust cases before the 1970s.
Although the historical phenomenon of increasing amicus briefs has affected nearly every area of the law, it may have been particularly influential in the antitrust context. As law and economics scholarship began to
criticize traditional antitrust jurisprudence, amicus briefs were often the
124
means by which these critiques were communicated to the Court.
Significantly, it was not until after Brown Shoe had been decided that
market-based antitrust scholarship became widely published. The decision itself may have even played a role in spurring the publication of
market-based critiques: Robert Bork and Ward Bowman’s 1963 Fortune
article “The Crisis in Antitrust”—the opening salvo of both professors’
career-spanning assaults on interventionist antitrust—was written partly
in response to the Brown Shoe decision, which they saw as symptomatic of
125
incoherent antitrust jurisprudence. The critique outlined in “The Crisis
in Antitrust” would grow increasingly influential as the years went by, and
antitrust law and enforcement policy would eventually gravitate toward
the Chicago perspective. Brown Shoe, therefore, stands today as a highwater mark of interventionist antitrust, largely disconnected from the
economic concerns of the current intellectual paradigm.

121

The case was originally brought in 1955, under the Eisenhower
administration.
122
Albeit the single most interventionist Justice of the postwar era. See supra
Figure 9.
123
Although Justice Harlan dissented on a procedural jurisdictional issue, he
concurred with the Court’s decision on the merits. Justice Frankfurter and Justice
White took no part in the decision of the case. For discussion of the Court’s internal
decision-making process in Brown Shoe, see Tony A. Freyer, What Was Warren Court
Antitrust?, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347, 370–81.
124
See, for example, the discussion of Sylvania, infra Part III.B.
125
Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, Fortune, 1963, at
138, reprinted in 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1965).
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B. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.—The Economic Turn in
Antitrust
The Sylvania case is widely considered a turning point in modern
antitrust. Its economics-based, pro-defendant holding and its explicit
break from prior Court precedent signaled a new perspective on the part
of the Court toward the appropriate role of antitrust law. Although Sylvania was not the first decision to apply economic analysis to antitrust law,
its clear endorsement of market-based economic theory heralded the future direction of the field. Andrew Gavil speaks for most commentators
when he writes that, after Sylvania, “a revolution unfolded in the content
126
of the law of antitrust.”
Sylvania concerned the legality of non-price vertical sales restraints
imposed by manufacturers on independent retailers—a different subject
than raised in Brown Shoe, but implicating similar social, political, and
economic concerns. Ten years prior to Sylvania, the Court had held in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. that a manufacturer’s practice of restricting the sales activities of wholesalers and retailers was a per se viola127
tion of the Sherman Act. GTE Sylvania, Inc., a television manufacturer,
engaged in distribution practices similar to those held illegal in Schwinn,
restricting the locations from which its authorized dealers were allowed
128
sell its products. One of these dealers sued Sylvania after attempting to
sell its products from an unauthorized location, in competition with the
129
authorized Sylvania dealer for the area. Applying Schwinn, the district
130
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) reversed the decision of the district court, distinguishing
the facts of Sylvania’s distribution practices from the practices held un131
lawful in Schwinn. Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court went even
further, holding that non-price vertical sales restraints were subject to the
rule of reason (rather than the per se rule), expressly overruling
132
Schwinn. According to the Court’s opinion, although vertical restraints
such as those employed by Sylvania could reduce competition among
dealers of the same brand (so-called “intrabrand” competition), this was

126

Gavil, supra note 4, at 8.
388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967). Schwinn, a bicycle manufacturer, had secured
agreements from its wholesalers not to sell outside of their assigned geographic areas,
as well as agreements from its retailers to sell only to retail customers (and not to sell
to other unauthorized resellers). These practices were intended to reduce
competition among wholesalers and retailers, increasing the price of Schwinn
products and encouraging retailers to invest in promotional and service efforts.
128
Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38 (1977).
129
Id. at 39.
130
Id. at 40.
131
Id. at 41.
132
Id. at 57.
127
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more than offset by encouraging competition among manufacturers of
133
competing brands ( “interbrand” competition).
Like Brown Shoe, Sylvania is a representative example of many antitrust decisions of its era—in this case, the transitional period of the late
1970s and 1980s. Specifically, Sylvania demonstrates the following characteristics common to many cases of the period: (1) the decisive role of
conservative Justices (particularly Justice Powell, the author of the Sylvania opinion); (2) extensive citation to law and economics scholarship on
the part of the Court; (3) extensive citation to law and economics scholarship on the part of the defendant; (4) a relative lack of law and economics citations on the part of the plaintiff; and (5) the submission of
multiple economically-sophisticated amicus briefs. Together, these characteristics clearly distinguish Sylvania from earlier cases such as Brown
Shoe and Schwinn. Although a full analysis of the Sylvania decision—one
of the most important in recent antitrust history—is beyond the scope of
this Article, the discussion below highlights the ways in which Sylvania il134
lustrates overarching trends.
1. The Court’s Opinion
The Sylvania opinion provides a clear example of the impact of Nixon’s judicial appointees (particularly Justice Powell) on U.S. antitrust jurisprudence. Powell—the opinion’s author—purposefully crafted a farreaching decision that extended well beyond the facts of the case, overturning prior Court precedent and reshaping the law of vertical restraints. Much of Powell’s discussion in Sylvania actually focused on criti135
cizing Schwinn, clearly telegraphing his desire to overrule it. After
finding Sylvania’s distribution practices indistinguishable from those in
Schwinn, Powell justified overruling the prior case on grounds of its fundamental doctrinal weakness; its confused, inconsistent application by
the lower courts; and its overwhelmingly negative reception by academic
136
commentators. This last factor appears to have been particularly significant, as the opinion cites the academic literature extensively—in total,

133

Id. at 51–52.
For broader analyses of Sylvania, see generally Warren S. Grimes, The Life Cycle
of a Venerable Precedent: GTE Sylvania and the Future of Vertical Restraints Law, 17
Antitrust L.J. 27 (2002); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of NonPrice Vertical Restrictions, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1978); Robert L. Steiner, Sylvania
Economics—A Critique, 60 Antitrust L.J. 41 (1991).
135
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 47, 51, 54, 56.
136
Schwinn is among the most criticized opinions in the history of antitrust law.
Its per se result had not been advocated by the plaintiff, but was rather a confusing
consequence of Justice Fortas’ widely panned opinion. Even a noted critic of the
Chicago treatment of vertical restraints has identified Schwinn as an example of “bad
workman-ship, sloppy use of terms, and a persistent failure to examine the reasons
why the decision might be criticized.” Peter C. Carstensen, Annual Survey of Antitrust
Developments: 1976–1977, 35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 16 (1978).
134
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Powell’s opinion includes 24 citations to law and economics scholarship,
compared to only six in Brown Shoe and zero in Schwinn.
These citations provided the basis of the opinion’s economic analysis of vertical restraints, which posited that manufacturers imposed such
restraints not to reduce retail competition and uphold prices, but rather
to ensure effective product distribution and more effectively compete
with rival manufacturers. Although vertical restraints reduced intrabrand
competition by limiting competition among dealers of the same brand,
they enhanced interbrand competition by encouraging dealers of competing brands to invest in promotion, merchandising, and point-of-sale ser137
vices. The logic of this argument was deeply influenced by recent developments in antitrust scholarship, particularly (though not exclusively)
the work of scholars associated with the Chicago School. Citing Richard
Posner, Robert Bork, and other prominent antitrust scholars, the opinion argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in ensuring the
maximum level of dealer competition consistent with the efficient distribution of their products. Thus, vertical restrictions imposed by manufacturers are unlikely to have net anti-competitive effects—particularly not
138
to an extent justifying inflexible per se treatment.
Although the logic of the Court’s opinion relied heavily on economic theory, it is difficult to say whether law and economics scholarship actually influenced Sylvania’s outcome. There is abundant evidence that
139
Justice Powell needed little convincing to overrule Schwinn. Powell had
arrived on the Court in 1972 with considerable pro-business sympathies,
as suggested by his prior experience as a successful corporate attorney,
his service on several corporate boards of directors, and his consistent
140
pro-business voting record following his appointment. In addition, only
two months prior to his nomination, Powell had authored the infamous
“Powell memorandum” to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a program141
matic call for the defense of the American free enterprise system. This
confidential memorandum, revealed after Powell’s confirmation, warned
of growing hostility in American culture to the capitalist economic system
137

GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54−57.
Id. at 58. This is a necessarily simplified description of the economic
arguments of Sylvania, which are no doubt familiar to many readers. For more
detailed treatments of the Court’s arguments, see Grimes, supra note 134, at 27;
Pitofsky, supra note 134, at 1; Steiner, supra note 134, at 41.
139
See A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the
Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841, 845 (2003).
140
Powell’s pro-business voting record was not limited to antitrust cases. For
example, he was also one of the most pro-defendant Justices in securities cases,
spearheading a rollback of many Warren Court decisions during the 1970s and 1980s.
See id.
141
Lewis F. Powell, Confidential Memorandum: Attack on American Free
Enterprise System (1971), http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/
PowellMemorandumPrinted.pdf.
138
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and advocated concerted efforts to spread pro-capitalist ideas among
142
universities, the media, and—most significantly—the courts. Whether
or not the Powell memorandum is proof of a premeditated judicial
agenda, as some critics of Powell have claimed, it is safe to say Powell’s
connections to the business world likely influenced his antitrust views.
As an example, Powell’s dissatisfaction with Schwinn (and the broader inhospitality tradition it represented) influenced nearly all aspects of
the Sylvania case. Indeed, without Powell’s intervention in the certiorari
process, the Court may never have heard Sylvania at all. As documented
by Andrew Gavil, Powell’s historical papers reveal that the Court’s initial
vote on granting certiorari attracted only three of the four Justices neces143
sary to accept the case. However, Powell requested a special relisting,
and lobbied fellow Justices to change their votes, successfully persuading
144
Justice Stewart. As the Ninth Circuit below had already ruled for Sylvania, Powell’s motivation to hear the case was clearly to revisit Schwinn.
Once the case had been heard by the Court, Powell worked behind the
scenes during the opinion-drafting process to ensure that Schwinn would
be expressly overruled, strategically tailoring the language of his opinion
145
to ensure the support of fellow Justices. Powell was highly conscious of
both the jurisprudential and economic significance of reversing the per
se treatment of vertical restraints, instructing his clerks to clearly articu146
late why Schwinn was both doctrinally and economically unsound.
Ultimately, Powell’s personal decision to overrule Schwinn was likely
made independent of economic theory. Nevertheless, economic theory
was the intellectual framework within which the decision was articulated
and justified. As discussed below, the economic content of the Sylvania
opinion was drawn from multiple sources—partly from the contributions
of Powell’s clerks, partly from the defendant’s merits brief, and partly
from amicus briefs (particularly that of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
147
148
Association). The plaintiff’s briefs, on the other hand, which relied
142

Id. For discussion of the historical context and influence of the Powell
memorandum, see Kimberly Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s
Crusade Against the New Deal 150–65 (2010). The memorandum is “infamous”
primarily among liberal advocacy groups, which see it as an inspiration for the
conservative intellectual mobilization of the 1970s and 1980s.
143
Gavil, supra note 4, at 9.
144
Id. Pursuant to the informal “rule of four,” the Supreme Court grants
certiorari upon the affirmative vote of at least four Justices.
145
Id. at 9–10. In the final tally, Blackmun, Burger, Stevens, and Stewart joined
Powell’s opinion, with White concurring. Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, which
Marshall joined. Rehnquist took no part in the case.
146
Id. at 10.
147
The Court’s reasoning was not drawn from any expression of Congressional
intent, statutory or otherwise. The remarkable activism of Justice Powell (and the
Court more generally) in shaping and reshaping antitrust doctrine may be an
example of what Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller have referred to as
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primarily on stare decisis, were largely disregarded by the Court’s opinion, despite their firmer grounding in legal precedent.
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments
The various Sylvania briefs and their different approaches to the
case highlight the vigorous intellectual debates occurring in antitrust
scholarship in the late 1970s. On the side of interventionist antitrust, the
plaintiff was represented by Lawrence Sullivan and Jesse Choper, law professors at Berkeley and proponents of strict, per se treatment of vertical
149
restraints. Sullivan in particular was an outspoken defender of traditional antitrust, and one of the Chicago School’s most prominent and re150
spected intellectual opponents. Despite Sullivan’s academic engagement with the economic debates of the day, however, he failed to
connect his legal arguments to the expanding economic literature, rely151
ing instead on a more traditional, precedent-based legal strategy.
Together, the plaintiff’s briefs included a total of nine citations to
law and economics scholarship, compared to thirty-one in the defend152
ant’s single merits brief. Moreover, most of these citations were actually
153
negative citations refuting the arguments of the cited scholar. Rather
than drawing on economic support, the plaintiff’s arguments against Sylvania’s distribution practices were primarily grounded in Court prece154
dent—namely Schwinn. This may have been a reasonable strategy given
Schwinn’s clear application to the facts, but it left the plaintiff with little to
155
stand on in the event that Schwinn were overruled. Instead of focusing
on economic efficiency, the plaintiff emphasized the broader concerns
that had animated earlier antitrust cases, arguing that per se prohibition
of vertical restraints ensured “fair and rational income distribution,” “an
economic climate in which any person can aspire to independence and
growth[,]” and the “[d]ispersion of political, social and economic pow156
er.” These non-efficiency arguments had little impact on the Court’s
majority, and were summarily disposed of in a footnote in Powell’s opinion: “Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic
“antitrust’s democracy deficit”—that is, the displacement of Congressional
policymaking by that of unelected institutions. Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller,
Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2543, 2544 (2013).
148
The plaintiff submitted an initial brief and a reply brief.
149
Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977).
150
Jesse H. Choper, Tribute: Retirement of Lawrence Sullivan, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 1221,
1221 (1991).
151
Brief for Petitioners, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No. 76-15), 1976 WL
181221.
152
Id. at iv–v.
153
Citing Bork in the context of arguing that Bork is wrong, for example.
154
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 151, at 29, 37, 41.
155
See Carstensen, supra note 136, at 23–24.
156
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 151, at 55.
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advantages,” he wrote, “but an antitrust policy divorced from market con157
siderations would lack any objective benchmarks.”
Sullivan and Choper’s legal strategy was typical of many antitrust
plaintiffs during this period. The emphasis on legal precedent rather
than economic efficiency, the appeal to traditional notions of economic
equality, and the relative dearth of law and economics citations were
traits seen again and again in plaintiff’s briefs up to the 1980s. For many
years, this had been a successful approach. Following the Nixon appointments, however, this strategy became much less viable, as marketbased defendants’ arguments began to win a greater number of cases.
3. Defendant’s Arguments
The defendant’s brief was characteristic of emerging trends in antitrust practice in that it extended beyond traditional legal analysis to pro158
vide an economic justification for Sylvania’s business practices. Defendant’s counsel supported its arguments with a total of 31 law and
economics citations (compared to the plaintiff’s nine), the vast majority
of which were consistent with the Chicago position on vertical re159
straints. The defendant’s brief also incorporated testimony of Lee Preston, Jr., an economics professor at Berkeley, to the effect that Sylvania’s
use of vertical restraints was more likely to promote competition than to
160
harm it. Preston’s testimony was grounded in a decidedly marketoriented economic perspective, according to which the self-interested
distribution decisions of independent manufacturers such as Sylvania
161
would—almost by definition—benefit consumers as well. A majority of
the Court apparently agreed, as many of the defendant’s economic arguments were reflected in Powell’s final opinion. Sylvania’s brief is thus
representative of many defendant’s briefs of the period: grounded in
economics, supported by academic citations, and addressed toward an
increasingly receptive Court.
4. Amicus Curiae Briefs
Sylvania provides an early example of another important trend in
antitrust practice—the increasing number of economically sophisticated
amicus curiae briefs. In Sylvania, three amici submitted legal briefs
(compared to zero in Brown Shoe and one in Schwinn), each in support of
the defendant. All three briefs included economic arguments, but one in
particular—submitted by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association

157

GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
See generally Brief for Respondent, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No. 7615), 1976 WL 181222.
159
Id. at 5–6.
160
Id. at 10.
161
See Carstensen, supra note 136, at 29–30.
158
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(“MVMA”)—made a particularly strong impression on the Court, per162
haps even more so than the defendant’s brief itself.
The MVMA brief was authored by Donald Turner, counsel to
163
MVMA, together with the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. In
1977, Turner was among the most prominent and respected antitrust
scholars in America. Holding a law degree and a Ph.D. in economics
(both from Harvard), Turner had served as Assistant Attorney General
for antitrust under President Johnson, and his multivolume antitrust
treatise, co-authored with Phillip Areeda, was (and remains) the single
164
most cited publication in the field. Although trained at Harvard,
Turner’s views on antitrust policy—always informed by economic analysis—became increasingly aligned with the Chicago perspective over the
course of his career. His MVMA brief was for all intents and purposes an
economic essay on vertical restraints, citing many prominent figures of
165
the Chicago School and arriving at substantially similar conclusions.
The MVMA brief was particularly well received by Powell and his
clerks. During the opinion drafting process, Powell advised his clerks to
use the MVMA brief as inspiration: “[m]y recollection is that the brief
filed by Wilmer Cutler is the single most helpful brief in this case”, he
wrote to them. “No doubt you have drawn on it heavily. If not, I com166
mend it to you.” Tyler Baker, one of Powell’s clerks, was as impressed
by the MVMA brief as his boss. Discussing the case with Andrew Gavil,
Baker recalled that “the Wilmer Cutler brief was head and shoulders
above anything else we had. It really was a masterful brief that was clearly

162

Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association as Amicus Curiae, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No. 76-15), 1977 WL
189274 [hereinafter MVMA Brief]. The two other amicus briefs were submitted by
the Associated Equipment Distributors and the International Franchise Association.
163
The precise division of labor between Turner and Wilmer Cutler is unclear,
though given the brief’s high level of economic sophistication, it is reasonable to
assume that Turner’s contribution was significant. Turner subsequently joined
Wilmer Cutler as counsel, suggesting their working relationship was very close.
164
The current iteration of the Areeda-Turner treatise, now helmed by Herbert
Hovenkamp, is Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (4th ed. 2015).
165
MVMA Brief, supra note 162 at iv. One important difference between the
position of the MVMA brief and that of the Chicago School was whether vertical price
restraints (i.e., retail price maintenance) serve the same economic function as vertical
non-price restraints (such as the policies at issue in both Sylvania and Schwinn).
Although many Chicago scholars believed that vertical price restraints and vertical
non-price restraints are equivalent from an economic perspective, and thus equally
deserving of rule-of-reason analysis, the MVMA brief explicitly disclaimed any support
for vertical price restraints, stating they tend to uphold prices and “plainly disserve
the interests of many if not most consumers.” Id. at 45.
166
Gavil, supra note 4, at 11.
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written and yet had all the policy arguments included.” This is not to
say that the MVMA brief persuaded Powell to decide one way or another—
it seems likely that Powell’s mind was made up even before the certiorari
process—but it does suggest that the brief helped shape the analysis used
to justify the decision. This analysis, in turn, has had far-reaching jurisprudential implications. Indeed, the MVMA brief is probably unusual in
168
the degree of influence it had on the law. It nonetheless serves to illustrate a more general trend in antitrust cases—the rise of economics-based
amicus briefs authored by prominent antitrust scholars. In the decades
following the Sylvania decision, this trend has only intensified.
5. Summary
Sylvania represents a transition period between two eras of antitrust:
the mid-century inhospitality era, marked by aggressive interventionism,
and the modern era of market-based antitrust, marked by faith in the efficiency of private ordering. Sylvania heralded the modern era with its detailed economic arguments and extensive law and economics citations.
These characteristics distinguished Sylvania from earlier cases such as
Brown Shoe and Schwinn, in which economics played a minor role. Sylvania remains connected to the earlier era as well, however, particularly in
terms of the legal strategy employed by plaintiff’s counsel. Although the
decision to focus on legal precedent rather than abstract economic theory was clearly the wrong one, it was not until the 1980s that plaintiffs began to regularly use economic arguments. The absence of any amicus curiae supporting the plaintiff reflects a similar lag—later cases would
feature economics-based amicus briefs on both sides.
Perhaps the most notable feature of Sylvania is the activism of Justice
Powell. This aspect of the case raises difficult questions regarding the influence of law and economics scholarship, highlighting the historical
ambiguity at the very heart of this study. It is clear that Powell—together
with his clerks—accepted the economic arguments of Sylvania and
MVMA, given that he incorporated them into the Court’s opinion. However, it appears equally clear that Powell’s fundamental decision to overrule Schwinn (and to hear the case at all) was dictated primarily by his political attitudes. Ultimately, the true significance of law and economics
scholarship as employed in the Sylvania case may have been in persuading marginal Justices (Stevens and Stewart, for example) to join Powell’s
opinion, as well as in enshrining Chicago vertical restraint analysis as au167

Id. at 13 n.31. Baker himself was almost certainly an important factor in
shaping the Sylvania opinion. Baker came to his clerkship after having studied under
William F. Baxter at Stanford Law School, and went on to work for Baxter at the
Department of Justice in the early 1980s. Baxter was a committed adherent of the
Chicago approach to antitrust, a perspective shared by his student Baker. See id.
168
In the words of Stephen Calkins, most amicus briefs in antitrust cases “sparkle
briefly and then expire, forgotten if not unnoticed.” Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust
Conversation, 68 Antitrust L.J. 625, 643 (2001).
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thoritative Supreme Court precedent. Through its citations to the Chicago School and its explicit endorsement of market-based economics, the
Sylvania opinion put litigants on notice that the foundations of antitrust
were beginning to change.
C. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.—A New
Era
Brooke Group, my third and final case study, demonstrates the triumph of economic analysis in U.S. antitrust law. In this 1993 case,
169
Brooke Group Ltd., a cigarette manufacturer, brought a predatory pric170
ing claim under the Robinson-Patman Act against Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., a competing manufacturer. Brooke Group claimed that
Brown & Williamson had priced its generic cigarettes below cost in an attempt to undermine Brooke Group’s competitive efforts and maintain
171
oligopolistic pricing in the cigarette industry. The Court ruled in favor
of Brown & Williamson, relying on a market-based theory of predatory
172
pricing. What is most notable about Brooke Group is not the outcome of
the case (market-based decisions had become the norm by the early
1990s), but rather the similar analytical perspectives of plaintiff’s and defendant’s counsel. Both sides agreed that consumer welfare was the dispositive analytical issue, and even agreed on the specific economic test to
173
be used in predatory pricing cases. In an antitrust “clash of the titans,”
plaintiff and defendant were represented by two of the most famous
174
scholars in the field, Phillip Areeda and Robert Bork, respectively.
Areeda’s association with the Harvard tradition and Bork’s association
with Chicago underscores the significance of their intellectual agreement, and illustrates the convergence of antitrust scholarship on a fun169

Formerly known as Liggett Group Inc.
The case was brought under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). Like the Court and most
commentators, I refer to this provision simply as the “Robinson-Patman Act.” The
Robinson-Patman Act forbids price discrimination “where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” Id. Brooke Group claimed that
Brown & Williamson had used price discrimination as a means of implementing
predatory pricing. In the legal context, the term “predatory pricing” generally refers
to pricing intended to drive a competitor from the marketplace. The vagueness of
this concept (and its potential for encompassing otherwise legitimate competition) is
one of the reasons for cases such as Brooke Group.
171
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212
(1993).
172
Id. at 243.
173
Id. at 222.
174
Id. at 211.
170
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damentally economic perspective. Plaintiff and defendant’s mutual acceptance of the consumer welfare vision of antitrust and their concomitant rejection of any broader, non-economic policy goals represented the
culmination of a paradigm shift in antitrust law.
1. The Court’s Opinion
The Brooke Group opinion bears many of the characteristics of contemporary antitrust decisions. Its ruling for the defendant was firmly
grounded in market-based economics, and reflected the skepticism of
many economists as to the prevalence and feasibility of predatory pricing.
Among its many law and economics citations—31 in total—the opinion
relied especially on a 1975 article by Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner,
in which the authors criticized the traditionalist understanding of preda175
tory pricing. Areeda and Turner argued that true predatory pricing was
rarely attempted and even more rarely successful, and that a legal claim
of predatory pricing should therefore require two factors: (1) evidence
that the alleged predator had priced below average variable cost and (2)
a likelihood of subsequent recoupment of the predator’s losses through
176
supracompetitive pricing. Without these two elements, Areeda and
Turner argued, so-called “predatory pricing” was more likely vigorous
177
price competition, which benefited consumers. The Areeda-Turner
analysis was highly influential even before Brooke Group, having already
178
been adopted (in various forms) by most of the circuit courts of appeal.
Although the Court’s Brooke Group opinion did not explicitly endorse the
Areeda-Turner test, it established a similar burden, holding that a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing must show that the defendant (1) priced
below “an appropriate measure” of its costs and (2) had a reasonable
179
prospect of recoupment.
This holding imposed substantial obstacles in the way of predatory
pricing claims, reinforcing decisions from the 1980s such as Cargill, Inc. v.
180
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. and Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio

175

See generally Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
176
Although Areeda and Turner’s 1975 article is most commonly associated with
the average variable cost test, it also set forth the recoupment requirement. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, Predatory Pricing Under the Areeda-Turner Test 1 (Univ. Iowa Legal
Stud. Research Paper No. 15-06, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2422120.
177
Areeda & Turner, supra note 175.
178
See Hovenkamp, supra note 176, at 1.
179
See Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 222–26. The Court did not explicitly endorse
Areeda and Turner’s below-average-variable-cost test, instead requiring the less
specific “appropriate measure of cost” test. However, the below-average-variable-cost
test was agreed to by the parties and was actually the cost test used in the case.
180
479 U.S. 104, 105 (1986).
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181

Corp., which had also relied on law and economics scholarship in deny182
ing predatory pricing allegations. In addition, Brooke Group distinguished (and effectively emasculated) the 1967 case of Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., the leading case in which the Court had ruled in
183
favor of a plaintiff claiming predatory pricing. Although Utah Pie was
not expressly overruled, it clearly belonged to another era. Emphasizing
that the antitrust laws were for “the protection of competition, not competitors” (citing, ironically, Brown Shoe), Brooke Group affirmed the Court’s
184
modern hostility to predatory pricing claims.
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments
In many ways, the most interesting aspect of Brooke Group is the nature of the plaintiff’s arguments. Unlike the cases of the Warren Court
era, in which economic theory was largely absent, or the transitional cases
of the 1970s, in which plaintiffs were outflanked by defendants’ economic arguments, Brooke Group featured substantial agreement between the
parties as to the fundamentally economic nature of the case. Specifically,
both parties accepted the Areeda-Turner test for legally cognizable predatory pricing: pricing by the defendant below its average variable costs,
with a reasonable prospect of subsequent recoupment. This adoption of
an economically rigorous standard was a major departure from plaintiffs’
185
arguments in earlier predatory pricing cases. The fact that Brooke
Group was represented by Areeda—coauthor of the test—only highlight186
ed the extent to which antitrust had evolved.
Like the Chicago approach to predatory pricing, the Areeda-Turner
test is grounded in a consumer-welfare model of antitrust, meaning that
the plaintiff’s arguments necessarily acknowledged that low prices were
187
only “predatory” if they resulted in economic harm to consumers.
Thus, although plaintiff’s counsel claimed the defendant’s arguments
188
exalted economic theory over economic facts, the two parties’ theoretical perspectives were actually very similar. Tacitly disclaiming Utah Pie,
which had focused on defendants’ “intent” of injuring a competitor, the
plaintiff accepted the more demanding burden of showing both below181

475 U.S. 574, 594–95 (1986).
Although Cargill and Matsushita were significantly different cases (Cargill
concerned a merger while Matsushita concerned an alleged predatory pricing
conspiracy), both cases involved claims of predatory pricing. See Cargill, 479 U.S., at
107; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 578.
183
See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 688 (1967).
184
Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224.
185
See Utah Pie Co., 386 U.S. at 698.
186
Areeda served as plaintiff’s counsel together with his Harvard Law School
colleague, Charles Fried.
187
See Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 225.
188
See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92466), 1993 WL 290103.
182
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cost pricing and likelihood of recoupment. This was identical to the
test proposed by defendant’s counsel. The primary point of disagreement
between the parties was not the appropriate economic analysis, but
190
whether the plaintiff had met its evidentiary burden. Unlike plaintiffs
in many earlier cases, Brooke Group’s counsel directly engaged with the
defendant’s economic arguments, devoting substantial effort to contesting its claim that a decision for the plaintiff would chill legitimate price
191
competition. Finally, not only did the plaintiff’s arguments focus on
consumer prices, they also dispensed with the equalitarian appeals that
had long been a staple of antitrust cases. Plaintiff’s full acceptance of the
consumer-welfare model, its reliance on economic analysis, and its ability
to engage the Chicago School on its own intellectual terms reveal the major changes in antitrust practice since the cases of the1960s.
3. Defendant’s Arguments
Just as Brooke Group was represented by one of the country’s most
prominent antitrust scholars, so too was Brown & Williamson. Defense
counsel included not only Robert Bork, a leading figure of the Chicago
School, but also Bork’s friend and former law partner Frederick Rowe, a
noted antitrust scholar in his own right and longtime critic of the Robin192
son-Patman Act. Unsurprisingly, Bork and Rowe’s defense of Brown &
Williamson’s pricing practices featured the consumer-welfare philosophy
and market-based economic analysis typical of the Chicago School. More
surprising was how much their arguments shared in common with the
plaintiff’s. Although their characterizations of the factual evidence (the
true area of contention in the case) were very different, both parties en193
dorsed the same analytical test for legally cognizable predatory pricing.
189

This acceptance could not have been more explicit: “We accept the burden of
showing that prices were discriminatory, below average variable cost, and were
undertaken with a reasonable prospect of recoupment.” Transcript of Oral Argument
at 3:13, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92-466), http://www.
oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_92_466.
190
Brooke Group’s failure to meet this burden was partly due to the testimony of
its own managers. Central to plaintiff’s theory of liability was its claim that the highlyconcentrated cigarette industry was characterized by tacit price collusion. Brooke
Group management had repeatedly testified that no such collusion existed, however,
contradicting plaintiff’s economic witness. Defense counsel seized on this
contradictory testimony, Bork exclaiming: “I don’t see how a company can come
in . . . the client itself can walk in and deny its own case, and then the lawyers say yes,
but I have an economist over here that will . . . contradict. That just doesn’t make any
sense to me.” Id. at 46:28.
191
See Brief for the Petitioner at 28–32, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92466), 1992 WL 541265; Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 188, at 41–43.
192
Years earlier, Bork and Rowe had practiced antitrust law at the firm today
known as Kirkland & Ellis LLP.
193
This was certainly the defense’s view. During oral argument, when Justice
Kennedy observed “[t]here’s no legal difference between you and the petitioner,”
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The arguments of defendant’s counsel were actually fairly restrained, considering Bork’s strong market-based views: For example, defendant’s counsel drew short of arguing that an independent oligopolist
such as Brown & Williamson could never successfully recoup supracompetitive profits following a predatory pricing scheme, the pro194
defendant rule which had been adopted by the Fourth Circuit below.
Nor did counsel argue that likelihood of recoupment should be the sole
test of predatory pricing (a rule that would imply the alleged predator’s
price-cost relationship is irrelevant), the “die-hard” Chicago position
which had been adopted by the Seventh Circuit. The defense even
acknowledged the continuing legal validity of Utah Pie, a case which Bork
195
had once described as among the worst antitrust opinions ever written.
These concessions notwithstanding, the general thrust of the defendant’s
arguments remained in keeping with the Chicago perspective, and many
of the themes of Bork’s scholarly work were front and center in the defendant’s brief. Although it never cited Bork’s work directly, many of the
brief’s arguments unmistakably harkened to ideas that Bork had developed over the course of his scholarly career. Among these, the most relevant was the brief’s repeated insistence that claims of “predatory pricing”
were often attempts to thwart vigorous price competition, the very economic activity that antitrust law was meant to protect. Thus, in most cases, imposing liability for aggressive price cutting was a perversion of antitrust law itself. Citing Frank Easterbrook, the brief additionally warned
that courts should be suspicious of any antitrust suit brought by a horizontal competitor, arguing that “[t]he books are full of suits by rivals for
the purpose, or with the effect, of reducing competition and increasing
196
price.” In arguing that strict enforcement of the antitrust laws could actually reduce market competition, the defendant’s brief echoed a central
theme of decades of Chicago scholarship.
4. Amicus Curiae Briefs
Brooke Group featured four amicus briefs, each filed in support of the
defendant. Two were filed by business firms with litigation interests similar to Brown & Williamson (in that they were past, current, and/or potential defendants in predatory pricing cases), one was filed by the Grocery Manufacturers of America, a trade group whose individual members
had often been subject to predatory pricing litigation, and one was filed
by The Business Roundtable (the “Roundtable”), an advocacy group

Bork agreed: “I don’t think there is, Your Honor.” Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 189, at 25:18.
194
See Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 341
(4th Cir. 1992).
195
Bork, supra note 1, at 210.
196
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 48 n.37, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209
(No. 92-466), 1992 WL 445371.
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composed of CEOs of major American business corporations. Among
these four briefs, the Roundtable’s is the most notable, as it represented
a growing trend of amicus participation by nationwide lobbying organizations. Unlike each of the other three amici, which had more or less direct
interests in the outcome of the litigation, the Rountable’s brief was intended to exert a more general influence on the direction of antitrust
law. In its brief, the Roundtable claimed to be neutral as between the
parties, both large corporations: “[N]either party is a member,” it stated,
“and The Business Roundtable has no special interest in the individual
197
fortunes of either company.” However, the association did have “a critical interest in the standards that are applied to judge the legality of ag198
gressive competition in the marketplace.” Its efforts to promote this interest at the Supreme Court were part of a larger historical pattern.
Throughout the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, the submission of
amicus briefs by conservative business and political groups (such as the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Enterprise Institute, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and the Roundtable itself) became increasingly
common. Today, these briefs have become a regular feature of Supreme
Court antitrust cases, often presenting market-based arguments that parallel the holdings of the Court.
As it happens, the Roundtable’s brief in Brooke Group was relatively
thin on academic citations, though it did cite to Areeda’s work on preda199
tory pricing. The main thrust of the brief was a general warning that
predatory pricing claims could chill legitimate price competition, together with an admonition that subjective “intent” (i.e., intent to take market
200
share from a rival) was an inappropriate grounds for antitrust liability.
Claiming that the Court’s decision would have effects “far beyond the
case at hand,” the Roundtable predicted “a real risk that aggressive price
competition in a large segment of the business world will be chilled” if
201
the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Like defense counsel, the
Roundtable cast the plaintiff’s case as an attempt to frustrate legitimate
price competition, a familiar narrative in antitrust discourse by 1993. The
Roundtable’s brief is therefore significant less for the originality of its argument than for presenting it on behalf of a powerful advocacy organization claiming to speak for the larger business community.
In at least one respect, the amicus briefs in Brooke Group are also unrepresentative of broader trends. Unusually for a case after the 1980s,
197

Brief for The Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 16, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92-466), 1993 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 45.
198
Id. at 1.
199
See id. at 5, 12 n.5.
200
Note that plaintiff’s counsel did not argue that intent alone could establish
antitrust liability, despite the Roundtable’s focus on the issue. See id.
201
Id. at 16.
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Brooke Group featured no pro-plaintiff amici. Although pro-defendant
amicus briefs outnumber pro-plaintiff briefs in many cases, the submission of pro-plaintiff amicus briefs by businesses, advocacy groups, and legal and economic scholars had become a regular occurrence by the
1990s. The high level of economic analysis which often characterizes such
briefs speaks to the broader economization of antitrust law, and their ab202
sence from Brooke Group is therefore something of an anomaly.
5. Summary
Brooke Group is another useful example of historical changes in the
antirust field. From a purely doctrinal perspective, the Brooke Group holding was far removed from earlier, interventionist pricing cases such as
Utah Pie. More significant for purposes of this Article, however, was the
convergence of plaintiff’s and defendant’s counsel on a shared intellectual vison of antitrust—one in which consumer welfare is the dominant
policy goal and economic analysis the dominant epistemological framework. Although defendants had made little use of economics during the
Warren Court era, and plaintiffs had been slow to adopt economic arguments in the 1970s, modern antitrust has become defined by a universal
embrace of the dismal science. The fact that in Brooke Group both plaintiff’s and defendant’s counsel were among the most eminent scholars in
the field only reinforces the significance of the similarity of their approaches. Antitrust cases had once been argued in terms of fairness, opportunity, and independence. Brooke Group announced the ascendancy of
the more limited ambitions of the modern era.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having explored both quantitative and qualitative features of 60
years of antitrust jurisprudence, I return now to the central question
posed in the introduction: What explains the transition from antitrust interventionism to the market-based economic approach that dominates
antitrust today? Did law and economics scholarship convince the Court of
the importance of economic analysis? Or, as the attitudinal model would
suggest, was this transition determined primarily by the ideological views
of conservative appointees? Given the possibility of mutual causality, are
these factors necessarily distinct and separable?
Based on the findings presented in this Article, my conclusion is
that both factors played important roles in antitrust’s transformation,
though the nature and mechanisms of their respective influences were
very different. First and foremost, changes in the composition of the
Court (and not changes in individual Justices’ views) were the most direct
and most significant cause of changes in decision outcomes. The evi202

Of the 25 cases in the database decided between 1990 and 2010 (i.e., the final
two decades), only three featured no pro-plaintiff amicus briefs.
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dence on this point is clear. The switch from interventionist to marketbased decisions in the early 1970s closely corresponds with the establish203
ment of the Burger Court’s conservative voting bloc. Although the voting records of certain incumbent Justices (most notably Justice Brennan)
did shift in a market-oriented direction over time, the effect of this shift
was minor compared to the retirement of liberals such as Black, Douglas,
and Warren and the appointment of conservatives such as Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist. In fact, when viewed in terms of retirements and appointments, the reversal in antitrust decisions of the 1970s was as much a
reflection of the pronounced liberalism of the Warren Court as it was of
the conservatism of the Burger Court. The evidence regarding economic
arguments tells a similar story. Individual voting data show that the Justices who responded most positively to economic arguments were the Justices who were already predisposed to casting market-based antitrust
204
votes. Justices who were predisposed to casting interventionist votes, on
the other hand (and with the exception of Justice Brennan), generally
205
responded negatively to economic arguments. Together, these patterns
indicate that when it comes to individual voting, preexisting political attitudes are of greater importance than the parties’ arguments. This is further illustrated by the specific example of Justice Powell, for whom academic scholarship was a means of justifying predetermined ends. For
judges such as Powell, voting decisions in antitrust cases were shaped by
deep-seated political attitudes regarding the role of business in American
society and the proper scope of government regulation. The evidence
suggests that these attitudes “primed” conservative Justices to be receptive
to economic arguments. It does not suggest that economic arguments determined their fundamental policy views.
If changes in antitrust law were primarily the result of changes in the
membership of the Court, does it therefore follow that law and economics was irrelevant to the antitrust revolution? I would argue no—in fact, I
believe that academic developments have been nearly as important as judicial appointments to antitrust’s transformation, though the mechanism
of their influence is more difficult to specifically identify. Essentially, by
altering the intellectual perspective of the broader antitrust community,
the law and economics movement changed the premises upon which the
entire field is based, with profound and lasting implications for the continuing development of the law.
The evidence of this change is the increasing acceptance of marketbased economic assumptions among intellectuals who had previously
been guided by interventionist principles. Considering the cases discussed in this Article, Donald Turner’s role as amicus counsel in Sylvania

203
204
205

See supra Figure 1.
See supra Figure 10.
Id.
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is a prime example. As Assistant Attorney General for antitrust under
President Johnson, Turner oversaw the case against Schwinn in 1967,
which established the per se rule against vertical restraints. Only ten years
later, Turner argued essentially the opposite position in Sylvania, citing
many of the Chicago School’s economic criticisms of Schwinn. Even before Sylvania, moreover, the Harvard tradition of antitrust scholarship
had begun to move in the direction of Chicago. In 1975, for example,
Turner and Areeda had published their economic model of predatory
pricing, which shared many of the Chicago School’s central analytical as206
sumptions. By the time that Areeda deployed this model as plaintiff’s
counsel in Brooke Group, his economic analysis of predatory pricing was
little different from Robert Bork’s.
Turner and Areeda’s increasing affinity with the analytical approach
of the Chicago School is only one of many historical examples of the
207
growing influence of market-based antitrust. Richard Posner, a noted
proponent of the Chicago approach and a central figure in the law and
economics movement, began his career as an antitrust traditionalist.
Working in the Office of the Solicitor General, Posner argued several
government antitrust cases during the 1960s in which he advocated (and
personally agreed with) the government’s interventionist legal theories—
208
before abruptly changing his antitrust views circa 1970. William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General for antitrust under Reagan and committed supporter of market-based antitrust policy, also held interventionist
antitrust views earlier in his career, which he explicitly recanted during
209
the 1970s. Even the Chicago School’s founding intellectuals, including
George Stigler, Ward Bowman, and Aaron Director himself, had at one
210
time advocated breaking up large corporations. Within the academic
206

See Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 697.
Nearly 30 years ago, Richard Posner addressed the convergence of the
Harvard and Chicago schools, writing that “the debate is no longer one between
schools that employ consistently different and ideologically tinged premises to render
predictably opposite results.” Posner, supra note 18 at 933–44. Marc Eisner suggests
that this convergence has been to Harvard’s disadvantage, pointing out that “it is
difficult to identify any concessions on the part of the Chicago school.” Eisner, supra
note 3, at 111.
208
See Stephen F. Ross, From Von’s to Schwinn to the Chicago School: Interview with
Judge Richard Posner, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Antitrust, Spring 1992, at 4.
209
See William F. Baxter, How Government Cases Get Selected—Comments from
Academe, 46 Antitrust L.J. 586, 588 (1977). Baxter “recanted” earlier positions that
he had endorsed in the 1967 Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy (commonly referred to as the Neal Report), a special antitrust policy report
commissioned by the Johnson administration which had made a number of
interventionist policy recommendations. 115 Cong. Rec. 13890 (1969) (report of the
White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy).
210
A conversion narrative appears again and again in the intellectual history of
the Chicago School. Robert Bork referred to his own studies under Director in
religious terms: “A lot of us who took the antitrust course or the economics course
207
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world, market-based antitrust theory has shown a remarkable power of
persuasion, converting former skeptics and displacing the prior intellectual mainstream.
By influencing the study, teaching, and practice of antitrust law,
these academic developments have had long-term policy implications.
Today, most antitrust scholars agree that the jurisprudence of the Warren Court was economically naïve, that consumer welfare is (and should
be) the primary goal of antitrust policy, and that economic analysis is indispensable to the proper understanding of antitrust disputes—each
principles attributable to law and economics scholarship. Even “postChicago” scholars, who challenge the analytical models of the Chicago
School, do so from a position of fundamental agreement with its focus on
economic efficiency. For example, a recent text critical of the Chicago
School nevertheless acknowledges that “U.S. antitrust enforcement, as a
result of conservative economic analysis, is better today than it was during
the Warren years—more rigorous, more reasonable, more sophisticated
211
in terms of economics.” Given this broad normative consensus, it is difficult to study antitrust in a law school environment today without being
deeply exposed to orthodox economic theory, the intellectual assumptions of which have achieved nearly hegemonic status. Given historical
developments in legal education, it is hard to envision future Justices (or
perhaps more importantly, their clerks) breaking from this economic
paradigm to any significant degree. Although changes in antitrust originally resulted from the partisan cycle of judicial appointments, academic
developments have ensured these changes are unlikely to be reversed.
As a final note, it is also important to emphasize that the “legal” and
“attitudinal” models are not the only explanations for changes in antitrust law. In addition to the jurisprudential developments discussed in
this Article, changes in the cultural, political, and economic landscape
have weakened the strength of antitrust as a populist force in American
politics and greatly reduced public demand for vigorous antitrust en212
forcement. Although the court-centric evidence presented in this Article does not speak directly to these broader changes, speculation as to
their major causes may nevertheless be warranted. First, Americans may
have simply grown accustomed to the presence of large, dominant firms
underwent what can only be called a religious conversion. . . . We became janissaries
as a result of this experience.” Panel Discussion, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of
Law and Economics at Chicago, 26 J.L. & Econ. 163, 183 (1983).
211
How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, supra note 18, at 5.
212
The decline of antitrust in American politics has been a long historical
process, not limited to recent decades. Richard Hofstadter’s classic 1964 essay “What
Happened to the Antitrust Movement?” shows that public interest in antitrust had
been fading throughout the twentieth century. Hofstadter identifies antitrust as one
of the “faded passions” of the populist reform movement. Richard Hofstadter,
What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in The Paranoid Style in American
Politics and Other Essays 188, 188–237 (2d prtg. 1966).
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in many industries. High levels of industry concentration seem commonplace today (think communications, information technology, etc.), but
represented unfamiliar and often frightening change early in the twentieth century. Even as late as the 1960s, amidst growing acceptance of large
corporations, consolidation in major industries continued to spark public
213
concern. Second, the rise of international competition from countries
such as Germany and Japan (and more recently China) seems to have
reduced public interest in aggressive antitrust policy, in two ways: by
providing new competitors in the domestic market and by rousing pro214
tectionist sentiment. In the context of economic globalization and the
rise of international business, the American public has become less concerned with limiting the size of domestic firms. Finally, the populist impulses that originally gave rise to the earlier era of antitrust policy have
taken new forms in the twenty-first century, adapting to the problems of
the age. While economic populism remains a powerful force in American
politics, it is today expressed primarily in terms of reducing wealth inequality, achieving campaign finance reform, and punishing the financial
industry, rather than the more traditional concerns of halting industrial
concentration and protecting small businesses. Americans today seem
largely indifferent toward the market dominance of many large corporations, and with the exception of the financial sector, there is little de-

213

For a mid-century perspective on Americans’ attitude toward large industrial
firms, see generally id. For the classic historical examination of the rise of big
business, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business (15th prtg. 1999).
214
The strength of this sentiment is reflected by the election of Donald Trump,
who made criticizing U.S. trade policy a centerpiece of his presidential campaign.
During his run for president, Trump threatened to penalize corporations that move
production overseas, impose new trade barriers against China and Mexico, and
renegotiate or “break” NAFTA. See Meghashyam Mali, Trump Threatens to ‘Break’ Trade
Pact with Mexico, Canada, Hill: Ballot Box (Sept. 26, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://
thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/255053-trump-vows-to-renegotiate-or-break-trade-pactwith-mexico-canada. At the time of this writing, it is difficult to predict what trade
reforms the Trump administration will actually pursue, though early indications
suggest President Trump will continue to take a hard stance on trade policy. See Tal
Kopan, Trump Transition Memo: Trade Reform Begins Day 1, CNN (Nov. 16, 2016)
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/15/politics/donald-trump-trade-memo-transition/. Other
presidential candidates—both Republican and Democrat—also criticized American
trade policy as overly favorable to foreign nations. Most notably, left-wing populist
Bernie Sanders committed to “[r]eversing trade policies like NAFTA, CAFTA, and
PNTR with China that have driven down wages and caused the loss of millions of
jobs.” Income and Wealth Inequality, BernieSanders.com, https://berniesanders.com/
issues/income-and-wealth-inequality (last visited Dec. 22, 2016). Even moderate
Democrat Hillary Clinton felt compelled to renounce trade agreements such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, suggesting the strength of the American electorate’s
concerns over global competition.
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215

mand for breaking up big businesses. Whether these changes in American politics have influenced judicial decisions is difficult to say, but they
have certainly reduced public pressure for antitrust legislation and enforcement.
Despite—or perhaps because of—this loss of public interest, few areas of law have changed as profoundly as antitrust since World War II.
Although much less dramatic in human terms, the changes in Supreme
Court antitrust jurisprudence are comparable in scope to changes in civil
rights, criminal justice, and personal privacy over the same time period.
As discussed in this Article, the proximate cause of these far-reaching
changes were the Nixon appointments of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
and the resulting shift in the attitudinal balance among the individual
members of the Court. At the same time, however, developments in academic scholarship have transformed antitrust’s intellectual foundations,
reducing the likelihood that these changes will be reversed, even in the
case of future liberal appointments. This broader intellectual shift may
ultimately prove the more significant of the two, as it has thoroughly—
and likely permanently—severed antitrust from its populist origins.
Moreover, to the extent that antitrust is the prototypical example of the
influence of law and economics, antitrust’s embrace of economic efficiency over traditional notions of economic justice is emblematic of larger developments in recent American legal history.

215

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, dismantling large financial companies
has becoming a rallying cry for many on the left (and some on the right). The
campaign proposals of Bernie Sanders, for example, included a pledge of
“[b]reaking up huge financial institutions so that they are no longer too big to fail.”
Income and Wealth Inequality, supra note 214. However, even in Sanders’s highly
populist presidential campaign, this pledge did not extend to firms outside the
financial sector.

